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INTRODUCTION.
Thesis of this dissertation: Ultimate reality is one .
Problem presented by the multiplicity of experience. 1-2
I. PLURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER OR SYSTEM.
The problem: Can a multiplicity of independent reals
form a system? 5
Science presupposes commensurabili ty among the elements
of the world. Quotations from F. C.S. Schiller showing
that he unwittingly abandons pluralism at this point 3-4
Vm. James errs in affirming pluralism on the ground
that the world appears to be a "collection." He
says unity is a mere "Grenzbegriff j " but this gives
away his case; for scientific knowledge advances as
we push back this limit ("Grenze"), i. e.
,
approximate
to an absolute monism 4-6
Unity of order is likewise implied in the teaching of
the idealistic-atheistic pluralist J. M. E. McTaggart.
His doctrine that the spirits which compose the universe
are moving toward one rational end presupposes some
unitary center of Being from which all things proceed 6-7
G. H. Howison's "harmonic pluralism" is really monism.
His conception of metaphysically distinct personalities
all freely yet with absolute certainty tending to the
"One Ideal" (conceived of as final bat not efficient
cause) constitutes an abandonment of pluralism 7-8
Conclusion: A world of order grounded in a One is im-
plied by pluralists as well as by monists. The problem
of an uncaused many forming a system has never been
solved by pluralism 9-10
II. PLURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERACTION.
Things cannot interact unless they are related in some
way. This relatedness is not a theory but an empiric
fact. This fact, involving a metaphysi cal Unity,
pluralism ignores 11-12
Pluralism is disproved by the very fact that things
exist . For the being of things consists in their
activity, not in any substratum of metaphysical substance
in which qualities inhere. Action involves interaction}
and interaction involves a relatedness in a unitary
whole. 12-1*

ii
Interaction between independent things is unthinkable.
Things which are ontologi cally distinct cannot affect
one another; if they did, the distinctness (pluralism)
would not be a fact. The difficult problem regarding
interaction is not to explain action across space, but
action across individuality. We cannot , except meta-
phorically, speak of the passing of "infxuenuea ,
"
"states," etc., because these are adjectival and
can have no existence apart from the substantive of
which they are predicated. 14-17
Uniform and systematic interaction of seemingly inde-
pendent things is intelligible only on the assumption
of all being as fundamentally one . The many are founded
by (or in) the One. They are organic to it. The One
maintains self-equality; hence changes in one part of
it must be followed by changes in other paits. inter-
action is thus a continuous process of readjustment
in the One 17-19
The objection, $hat some things are obviously unrelated,
considered. So mds and colors, poetic and comnercial
values, are incommensurable. This disparateness, how-
ever, holds only as to the relation of the things to
one another, not as to their relation to the fundamental
One. Two things must be remembered: (l) The phenomen-
ally-disparate things may seem so merely because of a
diversity of function assigned to them by the One;
(2) Immanent unity cannot be pictured, it must be
conceived 19-20
Things, Rational spirits, and the Absolute. --Seemingly
interacting things are to be viewed merely as the vary-
ing expression of the One Absolute immanent in them all.
They have no metaphyscial , i, e. , independent reality
of themselves. Persons, however, must be conceived of
as possessing such reality. This is a partial con-
cession to pluralism, but not an ultimate one, because
even these ontologically real per eons are fundamentally
dependent on the One 2C-Z2
Schiller's criticism of Lotze's deduction of monism
from interaction. Objection one: Tnteraction is no
problem, but simply a datum. Ans: This position is
anachronistic since Hume. Interaction, causation of any
kind, is not a datum, but an inference from concomitant
variation. Objection two: Immanent action of a One is
no more intelligible than interaction between the many.
Ans.: This is not true, for we do immediately experience
the fact that we act, while interaction is an inference.
Objection three: Change, action, in the Absolute are
excluded because an Absolute is not subject to outside
stimulus or to a "psychological condition of disequil-
ibration." Ans.: Outside stimulus, indeed, is excluded,
but the denial of a "psychological condition of disequil-
ibration" is absurd on the very ground Schiller urges,
namely, the religious 22-26

iii
Schiller's argument for pluralism from Lotze's denial
of "pure being." Schiller urges that the same line of
reasoning which leads to the denial of a unity or core
of being in things leads to the disproof of a fundamental
One. Ans.: If this One is to be thought of as some
sort of substance , the objection may stand, not, how-
ever, when the One is thought of as Cause; and this
is true monism 26-27
Schilleris criticism of Lotze's argument from coramen-
surability: '"Because the origin of a cosmos out of
chaos is thinkable (though not tenable) no monistic
inference is permissible. Ans.: Our concern is with the
actual world, not any number of conceivable ones, and
what is "untenable" in this realm is not to be permitted
in our philosophy
Schiller* s criticism of Lotze's Absolute: "An eternal
tautology.." Ans.: A rigid Absolute is, indeed, unten-
able; faot so, however, an Absolute wnich is thought of
as the very ground of all evolution
27-28
26-29
III. PLURALISM Am THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE.
Knowledge is the perception of things as standing in
relation. If relations, binding things into a unity,
are real, pluralism falls; if they are not real,
knowledge falls 30
Schiller urges that to argue from what is given to what
is impli clt is to arrive at what has only "secondary
reality and value." Refutation of this 30-32
Unity of reality demanded by the fact that it must be
interpreted in terras of self; and the self is a unity 32-33
Howison's rationalistic epistemology is not consistent
with his pluralism. Apriori cognitions imply a world
of uniform law. The "Spontaneous objective cognitions"
of all separate minds are all of the same world.
This would be a staggering coincidence in a pluralistic
world 33-35
James and Schiller frankly adopt an irrati onalist epis-
temology, thus being more consistently pluralistic
than Howison. This irrati onalism as to the whole is
professed in the interest of saving such part of the
world as is reasonable from the taint of error and evil 35-39
McTa^^art's untenable pluralistic episteraolo^ . His
idealism, "Esse est percipere " overlooks: (1) The
valid or real element in phenomenal experience, (2) She
fact that the many experients are experiencing the
same world 39-40
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Pluralism and Truth. --Pluralists accuse raonists of re-
ducing the world of experience to illusion. The reverse
is the case. Some monisms, especially oriental, may
have been thus guilty, but the error is not a necessary
part of monism. The deluded are those who do not go
bevond the first sense impression (visible heavens)
to the fact ai rived at wnen phenomena are viewed in
their connection (astronomical heavens). The pluralist
declares the true is the ^iyen (and the phenomenally
given is plural, of coarse! ) i the monist declares the
true is the coherent . Knowledge advances as our
apprehension of coherence among the diverse things of
the world increases , --that is, as the world is pro-
gressively perceived to be a unity. 40-43
Conclusion: The unity of universal interrelation is
the pre-condition of a knowable world 43-44
V. DOES PLURALISM VACATE THE NOTION OF AIT ABSOLUTE?
1. The Absolute and a "Block Universe .
"
Pluralists charge that in the system of an Absolute no
change and progress are possible. Not so, if the
Absolute is conceived of as realizing itself through
positing the many. The Absolute realizes its change-
less essence in the evolutionary process which it
posits. Selves may be thought of as metaphysically
real, as partaking of the nature of the Absolute; but
because they are ultimately dependent on this One we
are still left with a true "Absolute" and a true monism 45-47
The pluralist contention, that making the many dependent
on a One rules out change, is based on thinking of
eternity under the form of space. Space is static; but
the positin& activity of the Absolute is a continual
activity. The Absolute does not change, but it con-
tinually founds change 47-4d
2. The Absolute as Cause *
Modern pluralism represnts a reaction against absolute
idealism. Examination of passages from Howison, Mc-
Taggart, Schiller, and James,which show this interest.
An ethical strain and a sense of the importance of
individuality pervade their writings. 49-52
The ethical motive of pluralism may be sympathized with
without adopting its metaphysics. Moral responsibility
may be conserved in a monistic scheme by affirming:
(l) The ultimate Being is One, and the cause of all
things. (2) This causal One posits free beings. fhis
introduces a semi-pluralism; but because of the ulti-
mate dependence of the many on the One, it remains
true monism 52-55

VThe problem raised by pluralists is aggravated l^cause
they conceive of the relation between God and the world
in terms of substance . The true way is to conceive of
this relation in ter/ns of cause . Schiller accuses
monism of "equating God with the totality of existence."
It is not a question, however, of equating, but of
dynamic relation. 55-57
This causal or creative relation is denied by the plur-
alist. A created world is to him an illusory one.
Examination of the teaching of pluralists on this point.
They all end by introducing surreptitiously the idea
they have rejected. Their systems will not work without it57-61
As against pluralism a true monism affirms a creative
God. Ethical responsibility is provided for by admitting
ontological reality to selves; monism is maintained
by recognizing that these selves are fundamentally
dependent on the one creative Ground. The notion of
creation cannot be sacrificed and ground for an orderly
world maintained. Illustrations of this from the
writings of McTaggart, Schiller, and Howison. They
re-introduce what they begin by rejecting
3'. The Absolute as Intelligence .
In addition to unity and causality the ^ orld-ground
must be thought of as possessing intelligence. Eibin&
to this category we are enabled to transcend the anti-
thesis between monism and pluralism. For the unity of
meaning amid the diversity of psychological event pre-
sents us with a true analogy of cosmic monism amid
phenomenal multiplicity
4. The Absolute and Individuality .
The pluralists maintain the notion of a finite God.
Howison objects to the term, but holds the idea never-
theless. All selves are "infinite" with him. Examin-
ation of their writings on this point. Their theory
that only a finite QOd enables us to surmount the
problems of error and evil and meet the religious needs
of human li fe.
61-65
65-67
67-72
The objections to this notion of a finite G°d are meta-
physical and ethical. (l) Metaphysical. A finite &od
will not hold the world together as a cosmos. Ultimate
rationality, which all sciences must assume, requires
the dependence of the whole world on one rational Being.
( ) Ethical. Pluralists have an ethical aim. It is not
furthered through this idea of a finite sod. For this
makes evil ultimate and relieves man of responsibility 72-74
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Sundry pluralist objections to divine infinity and
absoluteness. TfcTaggart: God must be bound by the laws
of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. Ans.:
This is verbal. Schiller: The world, being in process
and not complete, shows God avails himself of means to
accomplish ends, and hence he is not infinite. Ans. : An
infinite God may conceivably choose to realize his
ends through a developing world. Again, Schiller urges
that consciousness involves the distinction between a
self and not-self. Hence God cannot be both conscious
and infinite. Ans. : This is verbal. If the Infinite
be quantitatively conceived it might hold; but the true
conception of the Infinite is dynami
c
7^-77
Confusion in the use of the term "independence. w
The pluralist denies that any beings could be ci eated
and independent at the same time. But if the world-
ground is absolute and infinite in the fashion above
described, he may be thought of as having created beings
partaking of his own nature. This would mean that
they were ir, dependent • On the o^her hand, pluralists,
apparantly unable to think of any other than a quanti-
tative monism, do not consider it possible for the system
of an Absolute to comprise true individuals. Examination
of statements of pluralists on this point. The diffi-
culty clears up when the One is conceived of, not as
the substantial all, but as the causal ground of all 77-81
The pluralist objection holds againBt a monism of onto-
logical stuff ; not against a monism which conceives of
the relation between the One and the many personally .
This thought provides a point of understanding between
monist j nd pluralist. References to James, Schiller, and
Howison to prove this 31-35
Monism does not necessarily take the pantheistic form;
nor does personalism necessarily take the pluralistic
form d5-87
Pluralistic personalism does not provide for the
possibility of a world of common speech and understanding 87
Pluralism, with all its ethical ardor, fails to found
ethics. Ethics assumes a ri ^ht to which the individual
must submit. This involves an assumption of the
rationality of the world order; and this, in turn,
implies fundamental unity. o7-G3
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5. The Absolute and Evil .
Pluralists dispose of the problem of evil by the thcoij-
that God is not bound up with all existence. Lxaminati on
of this easy solution in the writings of Howison, James,
and Schiller 90-93
Here, as previously, it is to be asserted, that plural-
ism is an improvement over monism only when the latter
is held in a pantheistic sense. Theistic monism pro-
vides for a self- limiting on the part of the Absolvte,
which at once shifts the i esponsibili ty for moral evil
from the divine, and because the limiting is. a self-
limiting, remains a consistent monism. Parallel betv;een
modern pluralism and ancient gnosticism 93-95
Here, as at other points, the pluralistic criticism
gains all its force from the failure to distinguish
between an Absolute as substance and an Absolute as
cause. The statement that in monism "all phases of
existence are alike characteristic of the all H (Schiller)
ignores the possibility of an Absolute positing free
beings within his system 95-96
Pluralism leads to no optimistic solution of the problem
of evil. Pluralists magnify the moral appeal of a
philosophy which assumes that even God may fail unless
individuals do their utmost. But the highest type of
devotion to the moral struggle is developed by the
faith that in the plan of an infinite God evil is
vanquished 96-97



INTRODUCTION.
The purpose of this discussion is to weigh the
relative merits of pluralistic and monistic metaphysics.
The method to "be followed will consist in an examination
of the main problems of thought on which these opposing
theories bear. The metaphysical difficulties of pluralism
will he set forth, the arguments of modern pluralists
examined, and an attempt made to establish the thesis that
ultimate reality is one .
The world of experience is composed of a multi-
tude of independent and interacting elements. At least,
that is the common sense conclusion. More critically
stated, change in one thing is followed by change in
other things distinct from it, or the emergence of one
state in the phenomenal order is the condition of the
emergence of another state. Strictly speaking, of course,
the connection (if there is any) between the two changes
or states is not a matter of observation, but of inference.
In fact, the problem becomes more mysterious the more we
try to conceive how something which occurs in one being
can be the source of change in another being. It is not
hard to conceive of changes in different parts of one and
the same being conditioning one another. The process is
there all within a unity remaining identical with itself
by making changes in one part to be followed by correspond-

ing changes in all its other parts. But how can the gulf
between separate and not connected "beings "be bridged,
making possible the action of one thing on another that
forms no part of any fundamental unity or system with
itself? This is a great mystery, which is not only over-
looked by common sense, but made hopeless of solution
by pluralism.
The problem of interaction here suggested
may be postponed for a space. Let us first look into
the problem of order and connection.
.

3I. PLURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF OKDjLR OR SYSTEM.
Pluralism conceives of the world as composed of
a multitude of independent units. These many units enter
into the relation of interaction and so the world order,
or the process of nature, emerges. The profound diffi-
culty overlooked here is as to how the transition is made
from a stats of isolation to one of connection. The
isolation is a fundamental postulate of pluralism. The
connection is a fundamental condition of a world. Both
are accepted by pluralism. With what consistency? How
can things which have no essential dependence on each other
or on some common ground arrive at a state where they
mutually affect one another? Indeed, the problem would
vanish if the many were looked upon simply as modes of the
One. This, however, is precisely what pluralism denies.
And so the problem of making the transition from independence
to connection remains on its hands. Yet this fact of
connection is constantly assumed. The pluralist is in
sympathy with science. In the person of William James he
is a distinguished scientist himself, ^ell, science
proceeds on the assumption that events hang together
according to a system of lav;. If uniformity of sequence
exists among happenings, then the things among tfiich they
happen cannot exi3t in perfect independence. Some unitary
bond must hold them together.
Can a world of independent Reals be an object of

4science? Science presupposes that things can be compared
and classified. What ground is there for supposing that
the plural elements, whose being is ontologi cally inde-
pendent of each other, will be thus commensurate? At best
it is presuming on a lucky chance that they should do so.
And yet, our modern pluralists are far from embracing a
thoroughgoing atomism. Schiller speaks of a "guiding
intelligence" ("Riddles of the Sphinx," 371). Again he
says : "Pluralism, by uniting the Many in an eternal harmony
,
necessarily arrives... at a state in which the ever-preBent
reality of perfection permits no question into what lies
beyond and before that actual." (op.cit. 359, italics
mine). Thus we see the ideas of unity and harmony
surreptitiously introduced into a system that is based on
their denial. Further, he states that the world-process
displays "unity alike in its conception and in its exe-
cution." (op.cit. 373). Prom this he concludes that
there can be no reason for polytheism. The point of interest
is, not his denial of polytheism as against James* toler-
ation of the idea, but the assertion of unity and order
in the world-process. The same inconsistency with plural-
ism appears in his speaking of "the union of the indi-
vidual spirits into some sort of whole ." (op.cit. 435,
italics mine).
Thus we see the pluralists constantly admitting a
fundamental coramensurability and unity of the world, in
contradiction to their primary thesis. When James is
conscious of making such concessions he hastens to assure

5the reader that he is speaking simply as a pragmatist. Unity
may, from pragmatist considerations, be postulated because
it is convenient to do so. "But absolute unity, in spite
of brilliant dashes in its direction, still remains undis-
covered, still remains a Grcnzbe&rlf
f
.
w ("Will to Believe,"
p viii). He remarks that the unity we actually find
seems to be that of a "collection." The universe is a
"joint stock affair." Here he has in mind the plurality of
the stock hollers, not the unity of the corporation. To
all this it may be replied, that a true monism wouli not
claim that absolute unity was an empirically discovered
fact. If it were, then the speculative arguments pro and
con of monist and pluralist respectively would be alto-
gether superfluous. But the very fact that the unity of
the world is a Grenzbe&ri f
f
augurs its truth. Scientific
investigation expressly proceeds on the assumption of its
trath. The advance in scientific knowledge consists just
in pushing our knowledge of the uniformity of nature nearer
the "limit", ( Grenze ) . If things do not in the last ana-
lysis form a unitary system the investigator of nature
would despair of adding to the sum of science. We may
cheerfully admit that in the limited state of our knowl-
edge the world presents much that is fragmentary. We may
even go so far as to say that our experience is for the
most part such as the pluralist insists on. But we refuse
to acquiesce in this broken aspect of things as their
final and true one. They do not simply happen to lie around
and move around together, meeting in a multitude of opaque

6attractions and repulsions; they belong together somehow,
and as our knowledge grows our insight into their i-ner
connection grows also. "Reason holds all things in solution,
to borrow an expression by which James characterizes the
fundamental postulate of the Hegelian philosophy.
The same fundamental monism appears in the
system of the pluralist McTaggart. It is a monism that
goes deeper than his abstract Absolute. For him this
latter is but the sum of all being. Thoroughgoing idealist
that he is, being is conceived only in the form of spirit.
All that exists is the multitude of spirits and their
experience. An absolute in the sense of a Supreme spirit
Si
he denies. For him the Absolute is imply the totality or
"society" of finite spirits. This unity or society or
Absolute, therefore, is something abstract and it would not
be fair to accuse McTaggart of monism on account of this
conception in hs^ system. There is a much more oo ncrete
use of fundamental union in his system. He insists, for
instance, that the Absolute is not simply composed of ele-
ments "mechanically" united. The world forms more of a
system than that. Particularly in his doctrine of karma is
a fundamental unity presupposed. Souls transmigrate in a
line of dttotiiiy wich, r talipes iiioral law. Effect follows
cause with perfect regularity. All soul life is bound
together in a uniform moral order. More than that, the
general trend of being is upward. He inclines to an
optimistic position. In other words, the multiplicity
of spirits which compose the universe are moving toward one

7rational end . Now, can this "more than mechanical" system
of things, this metempsychosis according to a moral order,
this trend of evolution toward a rational and happy end--
can these things be held in a pluralistic system? Mani-
festly, they presuppose some center of Being ^*iich holds
all that really exists in the unity of its embrace.
G« H. Howison is perhaps the most striking
monist among modern pluralists. He calls his system "Har-
monic Pluralism." The spirits which make up the units of
his world constitute "with God and with each other an
indi visibly harmonious vfriole." The sense consciousness of
human spirits is declared to rise "toward complete harmony
with the eternal ideal that is the changeless central
essence of each mind, and whose proper and only real
object is God." ("Limits of Evolution," 391). There is
a "sociality of the primordial logic of self consciousness"
which binds the monads into one. The unity which we scien-
tifically observe in the world of nature is accounted for
by the fact that nature is constituted by our minds. Before
the minds of all of us there is the one Ideal, God, and in
our spontaneous and free following of the singly Ideal our
thinking is brought into system. Harmony is due, not to
the constituting act of the one God, but to the fact that
all minds tend and create after the one pattern, God. It
is true, they are all free. They are not bound by any
necessity or divine decree to give themselves with such
"fealty" to the one Ideal. But they do this nevertheless.
It is hard to see how an author could assert a fundamental

independence among Mb monads (souls) along wi'h such
"beliefs as above outlined. What founds his "harmony?"
Only the "free following of a single Ideal" by the separate
units of the world. But if they are both free and onto-
logically separate, there is no ground for the assurance
that they will all follow the same Ideal, and thus form a
"harmonic" system. Howison here assumes a condition ten-
able only if the multiplicity of beings is conceived as
grounded in a basal One. He finds insurmountable diffi-
culty in the thought of free personalities being dependent
for their being on a One; but the solution he offers is
beset with still greater difficulties. It is harder to
explain how metaphysically distinct and free personalities
are certain to follow the one Ideal than how personalities
can be free and yet at the same time owe the conditions
and the essence of their being to one source. The very
determinism which Howison has sought to avoid is re-intro-
duced in aggravated form. He denies, indeed, that there
is any necessity in all this. The action of minds, spirits
is all free. But he asserts at the same time that it all
tends in the one direction, so as to make the world form a
system. Contin,_,ency is not allowed. Necessity is verbally
denied bat actually introduced.
We conclude, then, that an orderly world becomes
intelligible only as we conceive it to be metaphysically
grounded in a One. This is explicitly taught by the monist
tacitly implied by the pluralist. The latter denies, ^t is
true, that it is incumbent on us to givfi. a metaphysical

9account of the origin of the plural elements of being.
They simply and eternally are. We must accept them. To
ask any further questions as to their origin would be on a
plane with the child* s question, "Who made God?" It may
be oo needed to the pluralist that this is not formally an
irrational contention. It is certain that something has
to be accepted as a starting point in our speculations. If
we try to explain absolutely everything by something else,
we whirl away into the infinite regress. The question is,
what will best satisfy the demands of thought. An initial
One, or initial many? Naturally, the former is preferable.
Cogent reasons must be adduced if we betake ourselves to the
latter. Why the prodigality of ultimates? In adopting a
short-cut to the solution of the problem of evil and of
seeming disorder in the cosmos, pluralism creates more
difficulties than it obviates. More than tha*fc, pluralism
puts a strain on credulity when it asks us to believe that
each monad is causa sul . If the Reals are able to cause
themselves it is remarkable that they are so incompetent in
the production of things of a much lesser order than them-
selves and bring forth a world full of error and evil.
Further, the difficulty of an uncaused many remains unser-
mountable. For it happens that the many form a marvellous
system, a system so marvellous that it actually becomes
possl ble to think and talk intelligibly about them. That
they should have come together of their own absolute freedom
to constitute such a system is more unthinkable than that
modern civilized society should have been formed as a
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result of perfectly independent human individuals deliber-
ately entering into a social contract, as Rousseau thought.
Order is secured in our world only on the condition of its
having a unitary metaphysical Ground. Tacking that, the
order and sj^stem which science presuppose must be viewed
as the result of chance or necessity. This would be ex-
plaining light by darkness. If the universe were an
aggregate of self-existent elements, the chance of their
coming together and forming a system would be all but im-
possible. If, on the other hand, it roots in a unitary
ground, order becomes onceivable. Hence we infer that the
One only is basal, and that the many are dependent on it.
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II. PLURALISM AW TH^ PROBLEM OF INTERACTION.
Thus far we have been considering the problem of
order or system. We have concluded that this problem
remains insoluble on a pluralistic basis. It remains now
for us to examine the fact that things affect one another,
produce change, motion, and other results in one another.
Can this phenomenon be accounted for in a pluralistic
metaphysi cs?
Do things really interact? The very question is
absurd from the standpoint of common sense. Of course, they
do. We may reserve the right of giving an account of inter-
action different from that of common sense, but the surer
we are of the fact of interaction, the surer we lock all
beings into a unity of interdependence. None can act or be
acted upon unless they subsist together in a unity of some
kind. These strands of relation which bind things into an
interacting system are as truly objective and real as the
observed interaction itself. Wherein does the reality of
these relating bonds consist? Pluralism hasjio answer.
Monism, on the other hand, affirms that this fundamental
relatedness on wiich interaction depends is an index of
basal reality. This reality is not to be conceived of as
abstract. It is the most concrete thing in existence. It
is the very essence of things, coming to manifestation in
experience through the phenomena of nature. These latter
are made intelligible by this relating essence. It is this
essence that is to be thought of as independent, not the
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plurality of things whose interdej endence and reciprocal
affection can "be understood only as grounded in such an
essence. Things appear connected and interacting for the
reason that they partake of the nature of this essence. They
all spring from a common source; hence we can see how they
can form a cosmos. They all express this one essence;
hence when a change occurs at one point in the system of
expression (the phenomenal order of things) changes must
occur at other points also in order to maintain the self-
equality of the essence. Thus the appearance of interact-
ion arises; and only "by some such conception can the
appearance of interaction be made intelligible. All this,
however, involves a denial of any fundamental independence
of things, or pluralism.
Pluralism disproved by ths very fa ct that things
exlstT--In fact, it may be asked, Can things be at all
except as they express a unitary underlying reality? The
term "unitary" is advisedly employed, because of the ne-
cessity of recognizing a mutual activity of things on one
another^ and unless they are manifestations of the one
ground they would necessarily be so independent of each
other as to form parts of distinct worlds, and there
would be no audi thing as reciprocal affection. And without
this mutual action on one another we should never become
aware of their existence. In order to make this truth
clear it will be well to define what can be meant by a
thing
. A thing is not a parcel of pure being to which
sundry qualities are attached, or in which they inhere.
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This notion, is nowhere held among philosophers. There are
too many difficulties with the notion of inherence, of
subject existing in distinction from its attributes, to
make any such theory tenable. Thinghood consists funda-
mentally in actlvi ty . Only that really exists which acts.
A thing is accurately described only when we have discover-
ed the formula of its activity. Thi s formula or law alone
tells what any particular thing is. The conception of
activity cannot be abstrac ted from. With this idea firmly
in mind pluralism becomes inconceivable. For if the
nature of a thing consists in its activity, then it can
exist only as it takes its pl^ce in a sphere of action. But
action is not had in a vacuum. A thing to act must interact.
But in order to interact it must stand in relation to
other things. And to stand in relation to other things it
must with them have its ground in a One which founds them
all. Hence things cannot even be thought of as existing
except for and through one another. As acting they imply
one another. Their very being depends on their mutual
relation in a connected world. If they were perfectly
independent and incommensurable they could never get into
a position of affecting one another. They could, therefore,
never be found as acting. And unless they act they have no
real existence. Common Bense , indeed, assumes that things
existing first as independent unities afterward enter into
relations of action and reaction tov.ard each other. But
reflection shows the impossibility of construing the pass-
age of things from an isolated state to one of ontological
connection. Kow can independent beings become dependent
to the extent of affecting each other? How does it happen,
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if they are independent, that they conform themselves to
one another? These questions are unanswerable. The indepen-
dence superficially assumed by common sense and philo-
sophically defended by pluralism, must be dropped as un-
tenable. To the extent that they form an interacting
system they are not independent. And only to the extent
that they act on one another can they be said to exist.
Their existence itself, critism thus shows, compels us to
look upon them as manifestations of a basal One. The
effect of this conclusion on the ordinarily accepted notion
of "interaction 1* may be reserved for subsequent consideration.
Impossibility of i ndependence and interaction. --
Interaction between independent beings is unthinkable. A
change produced by one upon another involves a change in
each. To illustrate. The sun shines upon the earth and
produces vegetation. The sun is the agent, the earth the
patient. Entirely aside from the question how two supposedly
independent entities could fall into a relation of acting
and being acted upon, we see here that a fundamental union
is involved. For, after all, the sun is not the sole agent
in the case, nor the field on the earth the sole p tient.
The relation is in the reverse also. That is, a change in
the earth is at the same time a change in the sun, and
vice versa. The same sunshine through a different atmos-
pheric medium produces different effects. The sum of
cosmic energy remains constant. Its form changes in both
factors, earth and sun. Therefore a change in one is a
change in the other at the came time. This proves that sun
and earth are not separate and independent beings. Of
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course, it is not necessary to prove this. They form
parte of the one solar system. This reference to sun and
earth was only made to illustrate an underlying fact of
interaction everywhere, namely, that things which affect
one another reciprocally cannot "be ontologi cally distinct.
For in the final analysis the illustration does not go far
enough. In an interacting system the bond "between' thingB
must "be, not merely a mechanical, but an organic or a
living one.
The same result may be obtained in another way.
If things are distinct and separate, how do they find it
possible to interact? The answer is at first easy for
common snese: they affect each other by impact. The bat
strikes the ball and causes it to fly across the field. The
heat touches the ice and causes it to melt. It is true,
this explanation fails to satisfy even the uncritical mind
when it is a case of action at a distance. For such
cases the action is conceived in some round about way as
taking place through a medium which acts on another in
turn, all in spatial contact, until the eventual patient is
reached. The only problem seems to be how to act across
space . The real problem, however, is how to act across indi -
vidual ty
. To explain this problem a variety of metaphor-
ical explanations is proferred. It is said that "an
influence" passes from one object to another, what does
detach
this mean? Is an influence a thing? Can it dfcach itself
from one object to which it primarily belongs, hover in
space for however short a time, and then attach itself to
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another object, the object acted upon? If so, then the
agent is not the original thing, but the "influence" it-
self j and the problem of interaction, which the "influence"
was invoked to explain, would have arisen between the
influence and the object acted upon. And so the pi o cess
might be carried to infinity without bringing thought any
nearer a solution than it was at the beginning. Equally
unsatisfactory is the explanation that states or conditions
pass between things. A hot iron heats a cold one and loses
some of its heat in the process. As in the case of an
influence passing from one thing to another, we have here
metaphor passed off for metaphysics. For what is a state
or condition apart from a thing? Can it, any better than an
influence, make the leap across space or across indepen-
dence from one thing to another? States, conditions, like
qualities, are adjectives which have no existence apart
from a noun. The problem is just how to pass from noun to
noun, said nouns being ontologi cally independent. The real
difficulty consists not in action across distance, but in
bridging metaphysical distinctness.
To what conclusion are we led by these consider-
ations? To the conclusion, amazing to unreflective common
sense, that experience does not truly reveal the inter-
action of things at all, but only their concomitant vari-
ation. Hume, that genuine "radical empiricist," made this
clear once for all. Critical rationalism agrees with him.
There is a spontaneous concurrence of change. That is all
we can say. Observation yields no more. All talk of
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"forces" and "influences" and "states" passing from one
thing to another is nothing hut an unconsciously superadded
mythology. We observe many cases of change occurring with
uniform regularity; hence we speak of interaction. The
uniform occurrence of change is, however, all that is given.
To speak of interaction in the case is really to be guilty
of hasty metaphysics. This truth becomes more obvious
when the supposed interaction is psycho-physical. The
sight of a basket of luscious fruit is followed by an in-
crease in secretion of saliva. Colloquially we say the
fruit caused the "mouth to water." Can anyone tell what
this means? Surely no particle, power, pressure, or any-
thing material or mechanical passed between the untouched
fruit and the secreting glands. The physical result was the
direct result of a mental condition aroused by sight of the
fruit. But is there any possibility of definitely stating
what is meant by a thought acting on the physical organ-
ism and producing a certain condition? Manifestly not. As
a matter of fact, there is no absolute and universal
necessity in the sequence. The sight of the same fruit
might turn another man's stomach. How has the result
arisen? If we confine ourselves to the supposedly inter-
acting elements we are forced to remain without an answer.
Some deeper principle will have to be invoked for explanation.
All things fundamentally one .-- The conclusions
hitherto drawn in this discussion of interaction are nega-
tive. It has been shown that separate things cannot inter-
act; that something, however, actually happens which gives
rise to the appearance of interaction; that this appearance
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is illusory because reciprocal action among "beings onto-
logi cally disparate and independent is unthinkable j and
that therefore the thought of interaction must be given up
for the thought of spontaneous, though uniform, variation.
These considerations, however, leave the problem unexplained.
How shall we make intelligible to ourselves thie uniformity,
this action according to law, between the seemingly sera-
rate elements of the world? Only one course remains,
namely, to conceive of being as fundamentally one . In this
being all seemingly separate things share. Its nature they
express. Their distinctness and independence exists in
relation to one another (in the phenomenal sphere)j their
union and connection exists in relation to the founding One.
That which appears as the interaction of the many is in
reality the action of this One. Their existence must be
conceived of as conditioned by this One. Of it they are
organic members. This One is eternally perfect and com-
plete. Therefore any change in one part of its being must
be followed by changes in other parts, in order to main-
tain its self- equality. Hence what seems to be interaction
is really the process of readjustment constantly taking
place in the One. The dynamic proceeds from this One. The
reason for the multitude of movements and changes in the
world which we call interaction, lies in the perfection and
power of this basal One, into whose unity all things enter.
What looked like "powers, " "forces," "states," "qualities,"
passing from one thing to another was in reality the
immanent action of this ontological Ground of all being. The
contradictions of action and reaction between independent
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things vanishes, because there are no independent things.
What seem to he such are simply diverse modes of the under-
lying one. In its unity they are all dynamically compre-
hended.
All this sounds far-fetched from the viewpoint of
common observation. Things are manifestly independent and
interacting. Some things appear to be related in the
intimate connection of their reciprocal activity; but
others are clearly independent and unconnected. To this
natural objection two replies may be made. First, the fact
that many things seem independent may be ascribed to a
difference of function which the fundamental One confers on
them. w The world is so full of a number of things," and
among these in a universe of variety and change there are
sure to be many diverse elements. Taken by themselves these
elements may be as incommensurable as sound and color , or
as poetic and commercial values. But this distinctness and
independence which they exhibit as against one another does
not hold as against the world Ground. Here, in this Ground,
is the source of that unity which, with all their diversity,
they yet possess, binding them together into a cosmos.
The second reply is, that the unity thought discovers
immanent in things can not be exhibited to the imagination.
All attempts to do so are metaphorical and misleading.
We cannot altogether escape employing such terms, but it
is necessary to be on constant guard against misapprehen-
sion through space metaphor. "Parts," "modes," "emana-
tions" of the "infinite substance , "--such ire some of the
designations that have been applied. CnrvcJe pantheisms as
well as mysticisms are connoted by them. Such obj ecti enable
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meanings historically associated with these words do not
compose the view here presented. One true meaning may "be
found to underlie them all: finite things are not onto-
logically independent; somehow they are bound together in a
uni ty
•
Things, rational spirits, and the Absolute . mm
Modern "personal! stic" pluralists are idealists. Things are
the intelligently apprehended world -of world . The only
ontological realities are spirits and their experience, with
this view there need be no quarrel. The difficulty arises
when the many metaphysical entities are viewed as uncaused
and as not grounded in one fundamental essence. On the
other hand, a pluralist like William James does not accept
the idealism held by Howison, Schiller, and McTaggart. His
metaphysics might be described as atomism. If, however, the
postulate of pluralism be surrendered, it would be difficult
to establish any function for separately existing things.
That is, if our Contention, that all things are grounded in
a One, be accepted as proved, then separate things become
superfluous to thought. Instead of separate things acting
so as to produce the happenings of the world, the one Being
actB through all. The phenomenal reality, or validity, of
what are commonly viewed as things need not be called in
question. Their metaphysical reality, that is, their inde-
pendent, uncaused being, is all that would be denied.
Pinal analysis would show that they all merely represent
the activity of the one Being, the world ground. Because
they all spring from the same source, provision would be
made for their uniform action, for the possibility of
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formulating their motion and progress according to what we
call "natural law." In the non-personal world the many
would all have to he conceived of as immanent in the One.
When we reach the personal world, however, a seeming con-
cession must be made to the pluralist. Here we recognize
a relation besides immanence. The tens "transcendence" with
its spatial connotation is not satisfactory; but as the only
available antithesis to the term "immanence," it will have
to serve. Only, the concession to pluralism is not thor-
oughgoing. For an ultimate dependence, of persons on the
One, as their creative ground, would have to be maintained.
They possess a real distinctness, or otherness, however,
in that they are conscious, distinguish between themselves
and others, and in this conscious act of relation "detach"
themselves from the One. But this "detachment," while of
ontological significance as indicating centers of originative
power distinct from the One, is not absolute, because even
such metaphysical realities as selves cannot be conceived
as having their existence ultimately otherwise than through
the founding activity of the one. In any other case their
coordination into the world order would remain unintelligible.
At this point in the argument a further deter-
mination of the One may be made. That One hitherto insis-
ted upon may with propriety be spoken of as the Absolute.
The preceding paragraph has made clear that the term is not
meant in a pantheistic sense nor in a sense sometimes
associated with absolute idealism. Personality in the
multitude of rational beings is provided for. Their
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metaphysical reality, as against merely phenomenal things on
the one hand and the ultimate Being on the other, has been
emphasized. Nevertheless, the terra "Absolute" justly applies
t'O? the world Ground in the system contemplated here,
because all being, including that of ontologi cally real
spirits, is conceived of as rooting causally in this one.
The One, as causal Ground and everywhere immanent Agency, may
thus be denominated the Absolute.
From the standpoint of the writer the metaphysical
unity of things seems established by the considerations
presented thus far. The impossibility of explaining
causation between things compels us to think that they are
not really independent. They must be looked upon as con-
tained organically in a One, which by its immanent activity
in the world produces what is ordinarily taken to be action
between things. It is this One which is the substantial
Ground of the many. But having staked so much on the
argument from interaction it is in order to examine what is
perhaps the chief criticism of this position. This is to be
found in Schiller's discussion of Lotze's monism, ("Human-
ism," 62-84). Here Schiller denies that a unity of things
must be provided to account for the fact that things act
c
on one another. In fati Schiller denies that interaction
presents a problem for explanation at all. It is an
ultimate fact. We must accept interaction as a datum if
we are to have any world at all. "we may therefore con-
fidently affirm that without interaction there is no co-
existence, and without coexistence there is no world. The
existence of interaction is just as primary a fact as the
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existence of the world itself, and the assertion that
things act on one another is, in Kant's phrasing, an
which
•analytical 1 proposition, -Mch- merely expands what was
already asserted in saying * there is a world.' " (Humanism,
65-66). "The problem of interaction, therefore, disappears.
Or rather, it is merged in that of the existence of a
world in general, of which it is a variant. And the exist-
ence of a world is not a problem for philosophy." (op.cit.66).
AH this begs the question. It is easy to dismiss the
problem of interaction and call it a datum* Clearly, however,
what is given is concomitant variation among things. This
is all that sense reveals. To speak of interaction is to
draw in the category of cause, and cause, as Hume has
demonstrated, is not seen, but only inferred. Schiller, the
pragmatist, disclaims being either an empiricist or a
rationalist i but he must be empiricist pure and simple at
this point.
Schiller's second objection to Lotze is that
immanent action in the world Ground does not simplify the
problem of interaction any more than simply to accept the
datum of experience, namely, transitive action between
things. ( 68-69). "Te are accordingly told that the inter-
actions of things become Intelligible when regarded as the
ways in which the Absolute changes its states. The question
as to why it is intrinsically a more intelligible conception
that a being should change its own states rather than those
pf another is not raised in thiB connection." (66).
Schiller argues that Lotze virtually admits that "the super-
ior intelligibility of immanent as compared with transeu\
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action is not logical "but merely psychological, and due to
it
the familiarity with^whlch we seem to find in our own
inner experience." (68). This cannot "be maintained. For
spontaneity is something we ourselves experience. We know
that we act. Interaction, on the other hand, is not a
matter of experience, "but of inference; and if we can
exhibit the interacting system (successfully) as really a
case of spontaneous action, we have assimilated the fact to
something of which we have immediate exo erience, direct
knowledge. Schiller would rejoin, t'his is simply psycholo-
gical familiarity, not logical ground. This cannot be
admitted. To understand anything means to assimilate it to
our personal experience. We are entitled to think of
reality after the parallel of our own life. Has not Schiller
elsewhere ( HRiddles of the sphinx," passim) declared that
in a true sense our philosophy must be anthropomorphic? In
thinking out the matter of interaction anthropomorphism
helps us to a satisfying result. But Schiller seems
entirely averse to apply the anthropomorphic princi|>e at
this point. He says that we cannot affirm the continuity
of a (self-identical) Absolute through the multiplicity of
it3 states. We do this in the case of our own selves, he
adds, but that is because "we are conscious beings with a
feeling of our identity." (69). But we cannot infer the
continuity of the Absolute "like other people's on the
analogy of our own." This is an arbitrary renunciation of
the anthropomorphic principle which he has insisted upon.
Further, there are two other reasons why we are
debarred, according to Schiller, from arguing that because
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immanent change Is intelligible in us, therefore it 1b
intelligible in the Absolute. Change in us is due either,
(l) to outside stimulus; or, (2) to a "psychological con-
dition of disequilibration, " that is, a condition of un-
satisfied desire. (69). Neither of these could be applied
to the' Absolute without absurdity. The Absolute cannot
be affected from without, because there is nothing outside
it. On the other hand, to ascirbe change in the Absolute
to the second reason would be in the nat ire of travesty. An
Absolute with any want or unfulfilled desire in its nature
would have no religious value, (cf. 69). The first point
may be conceded, namely, there is nothing outside the
Absolute. Change in it could not be ascribed to outer
influence, an3 it is no part of our desire to maintain
anything of the sort, indeed, rather, as against pluralism
we would maintain the impossibility of just that. Prom the
second point we dissent. A dissent might be based on
precisely the consideration which Schiller ur^es in its
favor, namely, the religious. There is nothing inherently
objectionable to a God whose "psychic condition is dis-
equilibrated , " to use the author 1 s phrase, that is, to a God
with unsatisfied desire. This is surely true from the
standpoint of religion, whatever #ay be true from the stand-
point of an abstract philosophic Absolute. The highest
type of religion does not shrink from a God who suffers,
loves, sorrows, yearns and therefore acts. Sn\cJ.ller's
position is Spinoza* s argument against teleology over again,
a wrong, that is static, idea of divine perfection. And it
is just the static conception of truth which Schiller the
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pragmatist rejects.
TTiLle Schiller criticizes Lotze for concluding
that there must be an underlying Unity (substance) to
explain interaction, he agrees with Lotze* s teaching that
the "notion of a kernel of substance is a useless super-
stition. "Substance" here refers to the bearer of attri-
butes or qualities of a thi ng in uncritical thought.
Schiller argues, that, by the same logic as we reject an
underlying core of being in individual things, we ought to
reject the notion of a Single Substance underlying the
phenomena of the world of change. As Lotze declares, "it
is not in virtue of a substance contained in them that
things are, they are when they are able to produce an
appearance of there being a substance in them," so Schiller
thinks he ought in consistency to go on and deny his basal
monism by saying: 'it is not in virtue of a single sub-
stance underlying them that things arej they are when they
are able to produce the appearance of there being such a
substance.' Now, this discission holds no brief for
Lotze' s philosophy, though acknowledging much indebtedness
to his monistic teaching; Schiller's strictures may or may
not be well founded in some respects
t
but his alternative is
When
not necessary. Khjs argues from the above criticism that the
same reasoning by which Lotze disproves a unity or core of
being in things, a core to act as bearer of the attributes
or qualities of things, forces us to discard the thought
of a Unity of fundamental being to account for the diver-
sity of phenomenal appearance, we are compelled to dissent.
Such an argument might indeed be used to disprove a unity
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of Substance in the universe. The unity for which we
contend as against pluralism, however, is not one o f sub-
stance . but one of caus e. It is not to be thought that
some uniform substance (whether matter or mind stuff)
exists as a medium interpenetrating all other substances, like
the ether; the terra denotes a unitary Agent ira anent in
the whole system by its activity. Such a monism is not
touched by the objections urged by Schiller in his essay.
The One of our view, for which we contend over against a
fundamental many of pluralism, is neither spatial nor
material, but dynamic. It is a oneness of power and, we
later hope to show, of thou^t. Its omnipresence is not
to be thought of as substantial with any physical or
quantitative connotation, but as an omnipresence of activity.
Its unity consists in the unity of actively realized plan
which runs through all the diversity of its manifestation.
This diversity of manifestation, so apparent to sense, is
not to be accepted as a final fact, but is to be viewed as
a process in the realization of that unity of meaning on
which alone we can conceive a wo. Id to be founded.
Schiller next criticizes Lotze's argument from
commensurabiH ty , the argument, namely, that because things
can be brought under a scientific system of classification
and comparison, they must have a unitary Ground. This
argument "lacks cogency, " says Schiller* (70). His chief
objection is this: "The supposed origin of a commensurable
world out of an indefinite number of commensurable and in-
commensurable elements. is thinkable ." (72). He hastens to
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assure the reader of his personal opinion that it is not
for that reaBon tenable . But the co nceivability of such an
outcome, he contends, vacates Lotze's conclusion to monism
from coinmensurabili ty. In another essay entitled "Darwin-
ism and Design" in the same book Schiller contends against
natural selection as sufficient tc explain the world's
adaptations. He there comes very near himself proving that
the "origin of a commensurable world out of an indefinite
number of commensurable and incommensurable elements" is not
only untenable but unthinkable. At any rate, we are concerned
with the actual world, not with any number of thinkable ones.
The same arguments which, especially form the pragma tist
Schiller's point of view, prove the untenability of a
fortuitous origin of order and commensurabili ty , prove its
inconceivability for any purpose of establishing a practical
conviction of truth.
Further, Schiller denies the metaphysical value of
Lotze's Absolute. This Absolute remains self-identical.
?To rational case is made out for the existence Of change.
"It 8 sole aim, apparently, is to keep on affirming its
own identity in an eternal tautology, and why it should
pretend to change in doing this remains unintelligible." (73).
The crux of the difficulty here is revealed in the term
"eternal tautology." Change, indeed, is not provided for
if this correctly describes the Absolute. But Lotze is no
Eleatic. The very essence of his Absolute is activity. Its
inner being iB dynamic. Change, progress in the realm
dependent on it, is therefore founded in the Absolute
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itself. Certainly not in any change or progress of its
own nature. That must be conceived as eternally perfect.
If that provokes the epithet "eternal tautology," let it
stand. A world ground itself in flux would be unstable as
a source of being and progress. The Ground must be self-
identical in its perfection. But just because it is perfect
and may be conceived as desiring the perfection of its
dependents (supposing, for the sEk e of argument, that it
is self-conscious), it must found change and motion and guide,
within limits perhaps, that process toward a goal which
finally must be estimated in ethical terms. A chan^. ng
world ground would be no world ground, but would itself
stand in need of explanation. At the same time an Absolute
which did not found change and progress would not be an
Absolute. Later in this discussion the problem of change
will be dealt with more fully. For the present enough
has been said to show that Schiller's ciritcisra forces on
Lotze a static conception of the Absolute far from that
philosopher's teaching.
It is to be concluded, therefore, that the
supreme difficulty for pluralism presented by the phe-
nomenon of interaction, has not been solved. It is no
wonder that the pluralists seek to avoid and explain away
the problem. Their efforts in this direction cannot be
pronounced successful.
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Til. PLURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE.
The metaphysical significance of commensurability
has been considered at the beginning of our discussion.
This fact has even stronger epistemologi cal bearing on the
theory of pluralism. Knowledge is the preception of things
as standing in relations. This means that a known world
cannot be a pluralistic one. It is true, there are many
things in the world which we are not able to exhibit as
elements in a coherent whole. The mind refuses, however,
to take this as a final fact. Intelligible relations are
assumed to exist, even where they are not seen. This is
the assumption on which scientific investigation builds.
If now these relations which bind the world into a unity
are real, pluralism falls. If, on the other hand, they are
not real, knowledge falls. There remains no further use
to debate either the pluralistic or the monistic principle.
The only realities remaining would be the flowing impressions
and about them nothing could be said, for as soon as we
uttered a proposition we would be affirming relation,
which, by hypo thesis is null. To say A is B amounts to a
denial of the disjunctness of two things which may have
been appearing as disjunct in experience. Intelligible
speech is in itself a denial of pluralism
#
It is only in
the measure that things are viewed as commenai rable that we
can say anything about them. This commensurabili ty , this
standing in relation, is all that we contend for. From it
follows the unity of the many in the One.
But, the pluralist rejoins, we are argui.ig from
what is given in experience to what is merely implicit .
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Hence we are building on the airy, abs target foundation of
the relatively unreal. For example, Schiller remarks:
"Similarly, the ultimate reason why we may not argue
monistically from the actual plurality of things to the
higher reality of an all-including world-ground is that the
.2 f *plurality is actual(tV*-9
^
£a^O , while the unity is only
implicit ), and rests on our experience of the
former. It is, therefore, of secondary reality and value."
(Humanism," 225, note). What is "only implicit" is by
this pluralist thinker regarded as of "secondary reality
and value." The state of mind from which such a remark
issues is hard tc understand. "Only implicit I" When a mar-
iner sees an iceberg he knowB that a much larger mass of
ice is submerged than appears above the surface of the
water. He gives the berg due berth accordingly. And yet,
the submerged portion is "only implicit" in the protruding
portion, and "therefore of secondary reality and value." The
apple implies the apple tree, the egg implies the hen.
Surely we have perfectly unimpeachable ground for inferring
the reality of the tree or the hen from their products. To
ascribe tx> them merely "secondary reality" because they did
not happen to be sensuously presented at the moment would
be nonsense. The reality of the ground or cause of a thing
is in no wise "secondary" to the thing itself. Hence when
we speak of the logical implications of the experience of
knowledge we are not dealing with vague conjectures of merely
"secondary value." We are dealing with root realities.
Now, coherence, commensurability , and unity are implications
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of cognition as a relational function. They are therefore
primary, absolutely fundamental, not secondary, in their
reality and value.
Knowing is grasping a portion of experience as a
unl ty . as far as the world is known it is not fragmentary,
hut one. True, the world is not all known t but the goal as
well as the presupposition of science is a knowable world and
therefore a unitary one. The striving for knowledge pre-
supposes a unity in the whole of being, though this may be
grasped only in fragment. Some things affirmed by absolute
idealists leave the impression that this unity is known.
This properly provokes the pluralist dissent. Such a claim
is absurd. The ideal
.
net the possession, of unity is the
fact, what is here insisted upon is that knowledge is
impossible except with this unity of things as a primary
postulate on the one hand and as an ultimate ideal on the
other.
Further, we are driven to the conclusion of the
unity of reality, because we are compelled to interpret it
in terms of our own selves. This is anthropomorphism, it
is true, but inescapable. That is totally incommensurable
with ourselves cannot become an object of knowledge. Now,
since the days of Kant it has been accepted except by
extreme empiristic actualists, that the self is to be
conceived as a unity. Herein consists its essential nature.
Without an abiding subject, knowing itself aR identical
through the time flow, the stream of consciousness could
never rise to self-consciouai ess. The self as one must
transcend the psychological processes of sensation and
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knowledge. In the self life we have immediate experience of
ontological reality. Some of our pluralists v^ould affirm
the same. Very well, then, reality as a whole must be
interpreted in the same terms or remain forever inaccessible
to us. Prom this point of view we are constrained to inter-
pret the universe as an organic whole, ^e are not required
to show how this can he. It is enough to point out that
this unity is a necessary precondition of knowledge. It
would "be presumptuous to pretend to know how this unity
consists in every part of the world. Experience no doubt
shows breaks and discontinuities which we cannot cement
ever in cir present limited state of ^nderstanning, "But
we labor on nevertheless, believing that the breaks have
their connecting bonds, and that the fragments do ultimately
constitute a whole. To this there is no alternative but
the despair of skepticism. It may be said we are urging
faith where knowledge is expected. The answer is, we
satisfy ourselves with the implicates of knowledge where
direct cognition is impossible. An intuition of monism must
not be expected. It certainly is not claimed here. The
alleged intuition of pluralism is equally denied. Our
conclusion is simply that knowledge has meaning only when
it is viewed as exhibiting unity. Only in the measure
that things are brought under the category of unity are
they known at all. Only as the world is ultimately one is
it knowable. Our alternative is: monism or agnosticism.
Among pluralists Howison professes an idealistic
rationalism. He arg;es ingeniously that the very basis of
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pluralism is in the valid experience of apriori knowledge.
"The argument, in "brief, is simply that of taking up the
problem of reality and the source of knowledge , and in the
face of supposed evolutionary explaining of all apriori
knowledge away "by the cumulative force of hereditary habit
massed through ages, proving with exact care that every human
mind, and therefore by analogy that every individual mind as
such, does have and exercise this apriori knowledge. . .The
fact
unavoidable meaning of this is that every mind possesses
a spontaneous objecti ve cognition t and is therefore a
case of what, quoting the ever memorable expression used
by the writer of the Fourth Gospel, T have called the
possession of 'life in itself.* This, I maintain, is the
only intelligible meaning which anybody can attach to self-
existence, independent being, and real freedom; as also it
is the only intelligible meaning of knowing apriori." ("Limits
of Evolution," 417). Thus it will be seen that Howison
deems his system to stand or fall with apriori knowledge.
For the validity of such knowledge he makes an extended
argument, following Kant. Ke insists that his system
"neither accepts sensation as an unfathomable datum merely,
nor does it entertain the hypothesis that it is an effect
produced in the mind by some foreign agent acting as an
efficient cause." (p xxi )
.
The last clause of the quotation shows that he has followed
Kant in his correction of Berkeley's epistemology . He is
thoroughly. Kantian in his theory of knowledge. He complains
of the Oxford essayists ("Personal Idealism") for their
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"empiristic epistemology , for their "organized new assault
on apriori cogni tions. " This theory of knowledge of H°wison
is excellent. The question arises, does it harmonize
with pluralism? In a world where the ontological compon-
ents are independent it is strange to speak of apriori
knowledge. This presupposes sorie uniform system of law
applying throughout the realm of rationality, and requires
for its explanation a single center of living for the
knowable world. For the apriori knowledge context plated
by Howison is not something different for each mind. It is
uniform throughout the entire world of rational spirits. He
assumes, not only that "every mind possesses a spontaneous
objective cognition," but that this cognition of "every
mind" is of the same things and of the same kind in each.
This would be a staggering coincidence in a pluralistic
system. It could not be anything but a coincidence. The
uniform body of knowledge sp^rings up "spontaneously;" and
yet, there is no single guiding principle back of or imma-
nent in the plural minds to ass ire the commensurabili ty
or uniformity of the knowledge thus springing up in the
ontologi cally distinct minds.
In James and Schiller we find ourselves face to
face with a final irrational! em. Pluralism stands out in
its true light. This appears most unequivocally in James.
He is perfectly defiant and perfectly contented with his
position of a universe that cannot be reduced to one
system of rational consistency. Thst is seen in tbe
remark about the absolute idealst "uproar about
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chance." ("Will to Believe," p 178). The same position is
to be seen in his statement that "There is no point of view
absolutely public and universal . " novation contrasts hio
"conception of a pluralistic and libertarian rationalism,"
with "the irrational pluralism--ccnfessed to repose at bottom
on chance and unintelligibility--which is all that is
attainable or; the 'radical empiricism' of Prof. James and
his associate^." ("Limits of Evolution," pp xli-xlii).
This is not an untrue description of James 1 position by another
pluralist. Schiller likewise is an ar rationalist
t
but while
James is driven to this stand by his empiricism, schiller is led
thereto by voluntar ism. "The mere sincerely and completely
we recognize the presence of human activity in the cons' ruct-
ion of 'truth* and 'reality, 1 the more clearly is their
contingence suggested, and the less plausible does it
seem that all these apparently arbitrary procedures are
foredoomed to issue in the unveiling of one single inevitable,
and pre-existing 'system.'" ("Humanism," p 46). With
the phrase "human activity in the construction of truth"
Schiller means something else than the self-activity of
the mind in knowledge in bringing apriori principles to
bear on the raw materials of sense. He means something
ultimately constitutive of truth. He means to teach that
truth really has no existence or validity apart from some
concrete range of human interest. This range of interest
may change. Then truth would change also. There is no " one
system and no more, into which all truth must finally be
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fitted." "It may well be that many alternative systems may
be 'true,' and that 'reality' can be construed in various
ways by our varying efforts." From this it would follow
that there is no such thing as "eternal" truth. Mill would
doubtless be accounted right in his remark that in another
world than ours two times two might %ell equal five. "Ye
cannot decide the measure of truth possessed b.y ou* acLuui
bodies of knowledge by the mere test of systematic coherence."
"Our logic as well as our metaphysic will have to concern
itself more scrupulously and less perfunctorily with
pluralistic possibilities." (See "Humanism," pp 48-9 for the
above references). From the standpoint of Schiller's theory
there is no room for the conviction that reason pervades
the universe and that reason is one. Reason is reduced
simply to an instrumental functioning of the mind. It may
be one thing at one time and something else at another time,
we are guilty of hypostasizing a merely regulative principle
when we think of truth as eternal and unchanging. It is of
a piece with the whole trend of absolute idealism, which
constantly erects the abstractions of thought into neces-
sities of being. We must accustom ourselves to another way
of thinking. Intellectual construction, thought, truth
must be no longer viewed as having any independent significance.
They are in no sense ends in themselves, but merely means
to a more fundamental end which they subserve. And where
are we to find this more real end? Answer, in the realm
of will and feeling..

38
In all this we see that the epistemologi cal
weakness of pluralism lies in the fact that it accepts a
fundamental i rrationalism. This is not to he said of the
intent of Howison. He labors hard to save reason in his
world of disjunct elements. It cannot he said, however,
that he succeeds. Even against McTaggart the Hegelian it
is to he urged that he leaves the world unharmonized with
reason. Whatever is, is ultimate with him, error and all.
And yet, the pluralista do not make an utter surrender to
irrationalism. Rather, they surrender part of the world
to chaos in order to save a part of it for order and ration
ality. With James and Schiller, for instance, it is a
question as between cutting up the world and so rescuing a
portion of it from the wreck of unreason; or leaving it all
together in one, and so keeping it all under the taint of
error and evil. . But this will not do. Simply because we
may not be able to see the reason in things is not ground
enough for asserting that somehow it is not there. This
plea
is not a for blind faith. It is rather a plea for the
possibility of the life of reason and science itself. All
scientific progress rests on the assumption of a world
which is orderly and which is one. There cannot be two or
many bodies of truth or law. There must be but one,
universally applicable, or thought collapses and science
becomes futile. Now, the exhibition of this beautiful
rationality of the all is far from attained. It is not an
achievement, but an ideal of science and philosophy. To
deny it because throua^h the long labor of centuries the
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human mind has not yet reached it, is simply to make thought
impossible. The rationality of the world is the presup-
position of all science. In this matter, instead of going
off on the tangents of voluntarism or pragmatism or plural-
ism we must simply learn to labor and to wait.
The pluralistic-atheistic idealism of McTaggart
likewise presents insuperable epistemological difficulties.
He admits that the ordinary idealism, which makes the
reality of things depend on their being known by some thinker,
requires an omniscient God. To escape this result he
propounds an idealism which teaches, not that nothing is
real which is not known, but that nothing is real except
the knowers. The maxim, "Esse est percipi," becomes with
him, "Esse est percipere." ^o this it may be replied that
such a procedure cuts the ground away from under any
idealism. If idealism has any basis at all, it is in
epistemology . Critical examination of knowledge may lead
us to conclude that nothing can exist except as it is an
object of thought. It does not satisfy the objection to
say that only the subjects of thought are real. There is a
certain genuine reality of phenomenal experience, which is
object of these subjects, to be accounted for. This aspect
of the problem is ignored in the idealism of "Esse est
percipere." Moreover, with this multiplicity of individuals
and plurality of world- eont ent , the problem arises how the
many subjects happen to be experiencing the same world. If
the world is to be viewed as grounded in an ultimate One,
the problem does not arise. But if the world is many, how
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do we all happen to be experiencing the same one? Or, if
we are not, how does the illusion arise that we are? This
question about the common- to-all , which is the true principle
constituting objectivity, remains opaque unless we view the
world as, in the last analysis, the object of one Experient,
such as McTaggart regards superfluous.
Pluralism and truth.--Professor James ("Will to
Believe" ) accuses monism of reducing the world of ordinary
experience to illusion. In the interest of rescuing truth
for our knowing he embraces the pluralistic hypothesis. He
would not even call it an hypothesis, but would say that
he believes human faculties give us truth, and the truth
they reveal (of the plurality of things) he accepts as
final. This position sounds plausible to the uncritical,
and in the interest of popularising philosophy, which too
much has remained in the closet, it seems promising. As a
matter of fact, however, this position of James is the one
which reduces the world to illusion and lands us in skept-
icism. It is not the position of the monist which leads to
this result at all. It may be that some oriental pantheisms
have been guilty of the thing James criticizes, but the
difficulty is not inherent in monism and is not obviated
by pluralism. It is not to be denied th?t the sense fact
is pluralistic. Things as they lie around us and appear to
sense perception are many. The question simply is, are we
to stop with the data of a "radical empiricism?" Has
cognition attained its goal? Have we really arrived at
knowledge at all? Manifestly not. For why do we go beyond
the simple sense fact to the formulations of science? In
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the interest of knowledge and truth . The world of un-
connected manyness is unintelligible. Thought passes
from the rising and setting sun, given in sense, to the
revolving earth, arrived at only through thought. This
does not amount to a reduction of experience to illusion,
however. It is illusion in the boor, perhaps. Br'er Jasper,
who went up and down the country preaching that "de sun
do move an* de earth do stan* still," was deluded. For
him the sense world was in part illusi on, because for him
vh at was given in sense was final. The pluralist, however,
would not Ctontend for the dependability of experience in
any such fashion as in the case of Br'er Jasper. Neverthe-
less, with precisely the same logic as the darky preacher,
un-
he would found a metaphy3ic on^interpr eted sense phenomena.
Let it be emphasized, sense phenomena are not to be viewed
as illusions, veiling an ever-eluding "thing-in-i tsel f" behind
them. Against such a theory the pluralist protest is right.
Neither are sense phenomena to be viewed as final fact.
As to this the pluralist is wrong. These phenomena must be
veiwed in their connection . On no other basis can we
arrive at trath. In other words, we must assuue the
world to be bound together in a unity of system such as
is excluded in the pluralistic view. The sense fact is
real, not only as a psychological event, but as a revelation
of truth. But taken alone it may not enlighten us. We
must compare it with other sense facts and correct our
impressions by a repetition of impressions. If the
phenomenon were pure illus/ion we never could arrive at
trith. The radical empiricist is right in objecting to a
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cloeet-spun system of reality i but the immediate datum of
sense does not possess the same degree of reality as the
systematized construction of the scientist. We are not
walking in a world of dreams when we behold the heavens of
moving stars and a stationary earth; but we have attained a
higher degree of reality when we grasp the conception of
the astronomical heavens.
To revert to the original thesis of the above
paragraph: not the raonist, but the pluralist reduces ex-
perience to illusion. Both are compelled to build on
experience. But it is a fact frequently demonstrated in
the life of all of us that we are misled by experience
sometimes. When, then, are we to trost our experience? To
this question the pluralist (of the radical empiricist
kind) has no answer without shifting his base to some form
of monism. Thi monist says, that experience is trustworthy
when it is coherent . As a matter of fact, this is the
criterion by which everyone, pluralist included, tests
his experience. But this test involves a metaphysical
posi tion; and it is not that of the pluralist. The position
involved is that of a coherent world, where all things are
made for each other, and where their reality is recognized
by the way their appearance fits in with all the rest. Now,
such a world is knowable just in the measure that we are
able to reduce it to a unity in our thought. Science is
just this. It takes the mass of disconnected ele^nts
presented by sense experience and exhibits them as instances
of an orderly and unitary system of law. Philosophy is
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simply the attempt to continue the process which the
special sciences have begun. Its method is in the last
analysis the same. What the sciences do for single de-
partments, philosophy seeks to do for the whole reach of
human interest. The fact that the goal is not by any means
fully attained, but remains an ideal rather than a possession,
is nothing against the method. We have achieved humany
A.
desirable and intellectually satisfying results as we have
progressed from the observations of the boor to the
formulations of the scientist; and likewise we have gone
forward in our apprehension of truth as we have come' to
conceive of all the multiplicity of phenomena as expressions
of the One. But in what estate is the pluralist? What
assurance of truth has he? What warrant can he give for
the satisfaction of the demands of cognition? Nothing
further than bare impression, sense impression, in varying
degrees of intensity, perhaps, but single and unconnected
impression nevertheless. Since we know that impression
alone often leads us astray, we are therefore forced to
conclude that it is the pluralist who leaves us on the
perilous brink of skepticism, not the monist.
To what conclusion, then, does this reasoning
about the knowability of truth lead us? That everything and
every event whatsoever exists in and for everything else.
If it seems absi rd to say that everything exists in every-
thing else, we may state it in this way: everything forms
part of a whole to which everything else is likewise related.
In other words, the world in all its variety is but the
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expression of a single Unity; the many all have their roots
come
somehow in the One. To this result we owe for any knowable
world. For knowability, as we have seen, depends on
coherence. Coherence in a unity is just what pluralism
denies. Hence we are compelled on epi3temological grounds
to reject pluralism. Universal interrelation is the neces-
sary condition of a knowable world. On any other basis
experience is chaos, is, indeed, not experience at all. A
one-in-the-many is the precondition of science. Advance
in science Consists in the progressive exhibition of such
unity. What applies to the special sciences in their
particular realms applies to life and the world as a
whole. About no other life and about no other world could
we speak; none other could we make intelligible to one
another. It must be emphasized also that this unity or
coherence must be something more than a coexistence of
unrelated elements in a single space or time. The unity
must be an inner one, organic to the different elements
thems elves.
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IV. DOES PLURALISM VACATE THE NOTION OP AN ABSOLUTE?
1. The Absolute and a "Block Universe .
"
Certain historic associations of the term
"Absolute" one could wish to avoid. The Absolute satirized
by Hegel as the lion toward whose den all tracks pointed,
but from which none led, is not of the sort here defended.
Still, the term is retained, because the One is conceived
as the ultimate reality on which all things depend and from,
or rather, in which all individual things possess their
reality.
Against this view of being it is urged that no
progress or change is possible in it. Professor James
calls it a "block universe." Schiller urges a similar
criticism. This may be true of some monistic theories \ but
it is not necessary for monism to lead to such a result.
The difficulty seems to be that the Absolute is conceived of
as self-sufficient in abstraction from the many. This is
not our conception. The One realizes its existence in and
through positing the many. They are organic constituents
of the One. The ontological significance of the many need
not be denied in a monistic system. The thought to insist
on is simply that the many have their constitutive ground
in the One. This makes of the One an Absolute, it is true;
but not an unrelated Absolute. It is merely verbal to
define the Absolute as that which exists out of all relation
Our Absolute is conceived of as founding relations out of
its own being, and at the same time realizing its own nature
in that very act. The Absolute, if not wholly, at least
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really in part, comes to itself in the plural products of
its positing activity. Hence, to a certain class of the
many a real ontologi cality may "be ascribed. At once some
pluralist may hail this statement as a surrender cf the
monist case. No -
t
true monism is retained in that the whole
order of the many, even though it may possess a degree of
metaphysical reality in some of its differentiated parts,
depends for its existence and for its place in the scheme of
reality, on the unitary Ground. This Ground is thus con-
ceived, not as subsisting in a dreamy perfection indifferent
and unrelated to the world of change and struggle. In all
this movement the Absolute is immanent. Progress has its
reality in relation with and by comparison with the perfect
Absolute. It would be meaningless to speak of progress
except from the standpoint of the abiding. The Absolute
itself must be conceived of as changeless in its essence,
but as itself founding change and realizing itself, its
changeless self, in that process whose change and evolution
it is the very eternal nature of the Absolute to produce.
So the finite selves need not be conceived of as superfluous
afterthoughts in a system where the One Abso lute is all
and in all. As posited by the One, products, as we shall
argue later, of the self-limitation of the Absolute, they
have their own limited, but real, power of origination,
analogous to that of the Absolute itself, and by the use
of this power their acts are vital parts in the world drama.
Possibly some pluralist will retort at this point that this
is all he has been contending for, --the genuine reality of
B elves apart from the one world Ground. Indeed, just hvsre
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lies the possibility of clearing up the misunderstandings
from which no doubt a large part of the polemic "between
monists and pluralists springs. In this essay the term
"monism" and "Absolute" are clung to because of the desire
to emphasi ze the metaphysical dependence of the many on the
One, and because of the conviction that only on the pri-
mary supposition of such dependence can the world as a
cosmos be made intelligible.
The pluralists, however, persist in asserting
that to make the world dependent on such an originating
One rules out change. The Absolute is by definition
perfect. If so, all has been fixed from eternity. "Gen-
unie novelties, " "unmeditated beginnings," as James says,
are excluded. "The whole feeling of reality, the whole
sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our
sense that such things are really being decided from one
moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off
of a chain that was forged unnumerable ages ago." ("Prin-
ciples of Psychology," Vol. T, 453). A misconception
lurks here. It is that of conceiving of eternity (eternal
time) under the form of a vast reach of space. This space
all stands there complete at once. Time and eternity ai
e
^ft^so. (tfo attempt is maie here to distinguish between
time and eternity. As far as we can talk about it at all,
the latter must be thought of in terms of the former).
S ace is static -
t
time is a flow. If the many then depend on
the positing act of the One, it does not follow that their
destiny has been rubber-stamped in a book long ago. It
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means that their destiny is being worked out now , in the
course of time and change. The Absolute "worketh hitherto."
The Absolute is not only in the past. Past, present, and
future constitute one living whole through the activity of
the One in them all. The Fountain of reality is not simply
in the past, but in the continuous process which includes
the ever- changing present.
Still, the pluralist persists in asking, does
the Absolute change? If so, the designation "Absolute" does
not apply j if not, we are left with a "block universe" after
all. The answer must he, the Absolute does not diangeiits
activity in time, however, changes and founds change in the
world. "The "Finite God" of James is apparently included
in the order of change. This, rightly, James distin-
guishes from the Absolute. FoVWvwyrKe-v^e jio all-embracing
One. The Supreme Individual is himself one of the many,
"one of the eaches," to use a term from "A Pluralistic
Universe," (44). Such a God is insufficient for the
explanation of change or anything else. If the absolutist
fails to explain change because all is rigidly contained in
the ancient Origin, the pluralist here fails to explain
change because the. highest principle or being invoked (a
"Finite God") is insufficient as a causal ground for a
cosmic fact. On the other hand, it may becontended by a
critical monism that a living One, realizing its nature (or
will) through a continuous time process, is a sufficient
explanation of change, and does not involve a "block
universe.
"
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2. The Absolute as Cause .
In discussing change above the attempt has been
made to modify the term "Absolute" in such a way as to take
account of the just criticisms of pluralism. It is not be*
yond hope to look for a future understanding between
monists and pluralists on this point. At present, however,
the pluralists declare against an "Absolute." McTaggart,
it is true, uses the term, but denotes, not a basal Indi-
vidual, but simply the system or "college" as he calls it,
of all selves.. This, of course, is a singular use of the
t
term, and one which does not offend plurfcists, nor give
any satisfaction to monists. The word is generally avoided
by pluralists because of its associations. In fact,
modern pluralism is largely a psychological reaction against
absolute idealism. Behind it lies a feeling of the
importaae of personal individuality. Howison dedicates his
"Limits of Evolution" "to all who feel a deep concern for
the dignity of the soul." This well indicates the animus
of his philosophy. He confesses that, when his essays
were first published in the journals, "monism of an Hegel-
ian type played no small part, side by side with the
strongest affirmations of personal reality and individual
freedom.
. .At the date of their first production I had not
become aware of the hopeless contradiction between the two
views." ("Limits of Evolution," p. xviii). This seems to
be no less true of the atheist :.:cTaggart. Howison frankly
says that he abandons Hegelianian; but McTaggart , in an
exhaustive sutdy of Hegel attempts to show that Hegel is
really not the monist he is usually taken to be at all, but
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a pluralist. The success of his interpretation need not be
estimated here. Tt is perfectly apparent where his interest
lies. He has "been trained in the Hegelian way of thinking.
He is determined to remain a Hegelian, apparently; but
selves exhaust the whole of being for his thought, indi-
vidual selves. Hence it becomes necessary to show up his
master in philosophy as holding the same position. He claims
to have proved Hegel's Absolute to be, not a unitary being
at all, but simply the sum of all the selves of the uni-
verse. The Absolute is not a self. In this he differs
from the other pluralists who, while denying the absolute-
ness of God, still ascribe selfhood,, generally an exalted
selfhood, to him. In a similar way we see Schiller
advocating pluralism as a way of escape from an absolut-
istic pantheism. "And so it (pluralism) will approve of
that 1 personal idealism * which strives to redeem the
spiritual values an idealistic absolutism has so treacher-
ously sold into the bondage of naturalism." ("Humanism," xxv)
Again, "Monism has maintained a sort of prepanderarc e
,
because it appeared simple and more satisfactory to the
'philosophic craving for unity. 1 On the other hand, it is
incurably pantheistic, and disposed to dissolve away all
the distinctions between things. ("Riddles of the sphinx,"
350). Personality is paramount. The merging of it in the
Absolute is intolerable. This healthy self assertion on
the part of the individual finds expression in the plural-
istic attitude. William James evidences the same interest.
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"The philosophy of the absolute agrees with the pluralistic
philosophy which I am going to contrast with it in these
lectures, in that both identify human substance with the
divine substance. But whereas absolutism thinks that the
said substance becomes fully divine only in the form of
totality, and is net its real self in any form "Nit the all-
form, the pluralistic view which I prefer to adopt is
willing to believe that there may ultimately never be an
all- form at all, that the substance of reality may never
get totally collected, that some of it may remain outside
of the largest combination of it ever made, and that a dis-
tributive form of reality, the each- form, is logically as
acceptable and empirically as probable as the all-form
commonly acquiesced in as so obviously the self-evident
thing." ("Pluralistic Universe," 34-35). It is to be
noted that in every case the pluralism adopted is embraced
as the only alternative deemed possible to a pantheistic
monsim. These extracts from the writings of modern plural-
iets indicate what feelings lie back of their theories.
There is an ethical strain in their thinking. Pantheistic
monism, with its blur of moral distinctions, appears to
them intolerable. The only alternative which they recognize
is pluralism. There is something paradoxical in the fact
that some of them were trained in the school of Hegel. As
just noted, McTaggart considers himself a good Hegelian
still. Howison recognizes that he has made a break with
his former view in becoming a pluralist, james and
Schiller, on the other hand never had any sympathy with
Hegelian metaphysics; but their ^nti-monism, like that of
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the others mentioned, is due to a dissatisfaction v/ith
absolute idealism. The pantheistic merging of the indi-
vidual in the whole, the loss of human personality in the
all-inclusive "being of God, is the stumbling block. Jame*
declares that the monism he criticizes is that of Hegel,
iv
the Cairds, Royce
, T. H. Gree, TTettleship, and their like.
r-
Their "absoluteness" (see his^gomfi Problems of Philosophy")
errs at the following points: (l) It does not account for
finite consciousness: If nothing exists except as God
knows it, what are we to say about human ignorance? (2) It
creates a problem of evil that admits of no solution with-
out impugning the moral character of God. (3) It contra-
dicts the character of reality as perceptually experienced.
Change and multiplicity cannot arise in a fixed system of an
absolute. (4) It is fatalistic. Similarly Schiller says:
"Thus a personal and finite, but non-phenomenal, God is
the only possible cause that can account for the existence
and character of the world-process , and the belief in God's
existence is intimately bound up with the belief in the
reality of the world-process. Hence the method also of
our proof of God's existence stands in sharpest contrast
with that of Pantheism. It is not based on a supposed
necessity of hypostasizing the abstract formula of a logical
unity of the universe, a unity indifferent to every content
and intrinsically empty." ("Riddles of the Sphinx," 372).
It is possible to sympathize with what has thus
been outlined as the motive of pluralism without adopting
its metaphysics. The merging of the One and the many in
absolute idealism is untenable from epistemological as well
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as ethical considerations. The problems of error on the
one hand: and of evil on the other remain unsolved in any
such scheme. we are not necessarily driven to pluralism,
however, to escape these difficulties. This would involve
difficulties just as grave as those we sought to escape:
There is a monism which differs at once from the monism ^f
absolute idealism and from empiricist pluralism. Plural
-
ists call themselves "pers onalists , " "personal idealists."
These terms have a good connotation. Is there no retaining
them on the plane of an ultimate monism? This discussion
defends the thesis that there is The view may be stated in
the form of two propositions: (l) The ultimate Being is
one, and is the cause of all that exists . At once the
pluralist will rejoin, that the ethical integrity of the
One has been sacrificed, in view of the fact of evil' Hence
he rejects the notion of divine omnipotence as incompatible
with that of divine benevolence. (The adjective "divine"
is used. For the One, or vorld Ground, or Abslute, thus
far considered, may also be called "God." The causal re-
lation between the One and the many has appeared. Hence
there is no impropriety in the use of the word for Deity to
denote the iAe, with its theistic-religious associations).
The fact of evil^~teower«lV leads the pluralist to conclude
with a "Finite God." To this objection we answer with a
second proposition: (2) The Causal One posits free beings .
These are able to use their freedom in a way that harmonizes
with the purposes of their Cause; or they may use it in
defiance of that Cause.
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This second proposition will be claimed as a
Concession to the pluralist position. As against pure
»
absolutism it may be so considered; but it certainly is
just as much a denial of pantheistic absolutism as it is of
pure pluralism. If anyone wished to call the view summarized
in the two propositions "critical pluralism," there need be
no objection so long as the thing is understood. To the
writer the term "pluralism" does not accurately describe
the theory. It is monism, because all depends ultimately on
the One. Tt is ant i -pluralism in the conception that the
One could posit free beings, which, x*Hile dependent on
itself, still could defy it. Such a conception, sometimes
flaunted as unthinkable from the standpoint of logic, is
not without analogy in experience, for example, the
dependence of a son on his father. The latter is not to
be held responsible for the whole conduct of his son simply
because the relation of dependence is undeniable. It may
be admitted that the name "pluralism" could describe the
universe after the emergence of free spirits. There is no
need of insisting on terms. The objection to the use of the
term lies in the fact that it is associated with the theory
of an ultimate and eternal many. There is nothing inherently
inconceivable in the notion of free spirits ultimately
depending on a One. If we have such a system of free
spirits, then from the point of their beginning to exist
the universe would be pluralistic, that is, metaphysical
reality and power of origination would inhere, in some
meas ire, in the many as well as in the One. But the diffi-
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culties of an unoriginated many , a many joined to no
common source and yet somehow forming an intelligible
system, a cosmos, sre avoided, because the subsequent
pluralism, (so-called*) is seen to be ultimately dependent
on the eternal One,
Another illustration of the pluralistic way of
seeing only two extreme alternatives in the matter of an
Absolute is seen in Schiller's statement ("Humanism," 81),
that in a monistic system "all the phases of existence are
alike characteristic of the All." In otherjwords: we must
be pluralist s or pantheists. Between these two extremes,
however, there lies a middle ground. It is true, certainly,
pantheism links God up with evil in an intolerable fashion.
Pluralism pretends to solve the problem by cutting the
causal connection between God and the world altogether. This
is no solution. In the context of the above quotation
Schiller uses the expression: "once equate God with the
totality of existence, and no one can understand how there
can be in the All an element which is alien to the All."
(81). That is pantheism, certainly. But it is not necessary
to "equate God with the totality of existence in order to
remain monist. It is not a question of "equating," but of
cauaali ty . An ultimate monism may be held on the theory
that the one and only Ground has freely chosen to create
separate things. Further than that, it is perfectly
intelligible to conceive of this creative Ground positing
beings, many beings, which like itself are free. In that
case we have room for all those happenings in the world
which we would be loth to refer to a good Deity. They may
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"be products of these lesser spirits, all ultimately owing
their being to the One, indeed, but because raised to the
dignity of sharing the Creator's nature, having the power
of using a noble endowment in ignoble fashion, A more
detailed discussion of the problem of evil is reserved
for a later section.
Underlying the criticism of monism as implicating
God with evil is the conception of the relation between
God and the world in terms of substance . as seen in the
above quotation from Schiller. This is erroneous. The
world is not part of God; it is product of his activity.
He does not impart of himself as substance to his creatures \
he imparts himself in the sense of realizing his purposes
through them. God, the One Ultimate, must not be thought
of as the all-substance , but simply as the ultimate cause of
all. The essence of his being is causal intelligence.
As such he posits the products of his purpose as we do our
thoughts. Among such products it is conceivable there may
be free spirits. Once having posited them there would be
a contingent pluralism--by extension of the term; but a
proper pluralism it would not be, for the whole would
originally be dependent on the One. tfor is there a contra-
diction in the statement that the relation between God and
the world must not be thought of under the form of substance,
and the other statement that rational spirits share in the
very nature of God. What is meant is, that these spirits
are not quantitative portions of God's being, but dynamic
products of his creative activity.
The monism here contended for does not conceive
of tue One as the aggregate of all being. It is only
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against such a conception that the criticisms of pluralism
hold. If the many are merely parts of the One, no real
independence could "be asserted of them; neither could any
individuality be asserted of the One. For the Absolute
would be consumed in its modes or manifestations. When,
however, the relation between the two is thought of under
the form of causality, the difficulty vanishes. In this
conception of the unity of all things through a common
causal ground the difficulties raised by pluralism are
solved. The many are one, \\ot as being parts of the same
substance, but as being products of the same creative
power.
The notion of creation demands further specifi-
cation. This notion is a stone of stumbling for the
pluralist. The very mark of ontological reality in anything
for him is the fact of 'its not being originated. A world of
created beings means in his thinking a world of unreal
beings. The selves, if created, are but part of the
illusory order of unreality. Our reply is, that a world
of plurality and change is but a groundless flux or phan-
tasm unless it is conceived as taking its point of departure
from some creative ground. The whole hangs on nothing.
Movement, change, lacking a unitary and purposive direction,
is either chaotic, or else its orderly process remains an
opaque mystery. The question is only, which is the greater
mystery, the affirmation of causal Intelligence, or the
denial of such causality? Manifestly the strain on faith is
less in the affirmation. In order to meet the pluralist
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difficulty regarding causation and creation it will be
well to examine the statements of some of its exponents on
the subject.
For McTaggart creation and causation in the
metaphysical sense are superfluous. Things are not created,
they simply are. Existence is for him scarcely an evolution -t
it is simply a revolution world without end of eternally
given elements of being. (See "Some Dogmas of Religion,"
chapter on "A Non-Omnipotent God," Sec. A.). The very idea
of. creation is amass of contradictions. His fundamental
view is that "All existent reality is eternal and ultimate...
There can not be a creative God, or a creator of any sort
because there is nothing for him to create." The universe
is not a creation, but a summation. Howison agrees with
McTaggart in denying that God created the world j but he says
that man created it. It is a mistake to think that man is
an outcome of the evolutionary movement in nature. Man is
prior to it. It depends on him and his thinking, not he
on it. The Prime Mover is not God, but the entire world of
spirits. sMan- determined the. order of nature, not vice
versa. "Not only God, but also the entire world of free
minds other than God, must condition Nature; and, as we
shall learn later in our inquiry, they must condition it in
a sense that God does not. They . we shall find, must be
directly and productively causal of it, while God's con-
ditioning of it can be only indirect and remote
;
namely, as
we shall see, by the constant reference to him, as their ruli
Ideal, which their nature-begetting minds spontaneously
have." ("Limits of Evolution," 325-326). /The universe
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exists "in and through our knowing it." Cognition is con-
sidered by him to be the indispensable condition of the
existence of reality. The world is a "consensus." His
system attempts to explain nature "wholly from the resources
of the individual mind." In the full sense, the whole
circle of minds, he says, must be added to the explanation,
that is, the whole orb of minds, all spirits, including God.
But when we have reached this stage, we are no longer, he
says, in the region of efficient causation, but in that of
fi nal causation. This touches the next point in his view
of cause. That an underlying divine causality is bringing
the world to its consummation of perfection he would not
denyj but this guiding work of God is accomplished, not as
is usually supposed, by efficient causation, but by final
causation. It is not the power of force, but the power of
persuading rational beings. Howison declares that the key
to his whole view is "found in its doctrine concerning the
sy s t em of causation." Final cause instead of efficient
cause holds the organizing place. He goes so far as to
speak of this as "the grounding and constitutive principle
of real existence." (op.cit. pp xvii-xviii). The oontrol
exercised is that of an Ideal, held before the minds of
eternal spirits, who are on their part supposed to follow
in spontaneous freedom. But they follow, they are not
forced. God is the "Ideal Goal toward which each conscious-
ness in its eternal freedom moves its merely natural and
shifting being, in its effort after complete accord between
the two phases of its nature, the eternal and the temporal,
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the rational and the sensuous. " (o|>.cit. 391-392). God's
efficient action on the phenomenal order, that is, on that
part of the world not composed of spirits, is not deemed
necessary. In fact, it is denied. God rules us by holding
the Ideal of Perfection, that is, himself, before us. We
spontaneously follow, though free, and then the world of
phenomena, which depends entirely on our thinking, or
the thinking of other spirits less than God, is fashioned
gradually after the pattern which God has inspired in us.
Schiller allows to God more efficient action.
He conceives of him as the creator of the phenomenal world.
("Riddles of the Sphinx," chapter on "Man and God."). Of
man he says God is "cause," but he does not speak of him as
"creator." This would not comport with his pluralism. When
he thus ppeaks of man as caused by God, he does not mean
his transcendental ego, which is the eternal part of him;
rather, he means only man's phenomenal self. While with
Howison the world process is simply the product of the
thought of individual spirits other than God, with Schiller
it is the product of an interaction between transcendental
egos and God. The material evolution is the product of a
partnership action between the divine and lesser spirits.
The contrast between Schiller and Howison on this point is
seen in the following: "We have, therefore, in the world
process the working of an intelligence which not only
guides the actions of the unconscious material existences,
but overrules those of the conscious intelligences ." (op/
cit. 371, italics mine). An "overruling" of free beings
Howison could not tolerate in his system. Schiller, himself,
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would not claim that this overruling is that of omnipotence;
but yet that of a power greater than possessed "by human
selves. In this overruling power he sees the warrant of a
final "kingdom of heaven. 11 The marks of this overruling
Intelligence he recognizes in the purposeful adaptations
in nature. His approval of the teleological argument is
complete.
As against these theories monism affirms a God
who creates the world. This is meant to apply to the real
world, not to the phenomenal order only, as in the case of
Schiller. The pluralists hold the real world to he one of
spirits. These together with God create the phenomenal
world. This idealistic view of "creation," (if we desire
to use that term) is satisfactory j but it does not go far
enough. The ultimate elements of being, spirits themsleves,
must be viewed as owing their origin $o the Absolute. The
motive in denying this on the part of pluralists is good
enough. Individuality and freedom are to be conserved for
man. These need not be considered as sacrificed, however,
if he is looked upon, in his inner nature, as coming from
God. For the Creator may will to grant him just that coveted
independence. The determinist and the thorough-going
pantheist cannot see this,, of course, with this feeling
it is easy to have profound sympathy. In fact, some sort
of pluralism must be maintained in the interest of moral
responsibility. But it need not be an ultimate pluralism.
Let it be one from the point of creation on. Let it be
dependent on the positing will of the world Gro ind, and let
its continuance be conditioned on the purpose of God. In
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the space between, a large measure of pluralism may safely
be affirmed.
The notion of creation is necessary to secure
order in the world. Unless it be the work of an intelligent
world Ground, there is nothing left to give us a cosmos but
chance or necessity. This would be expecting light from
darkness. If the universe were an aggregate of self-
existent elements, the chance of their coming together and
forming a system would be all but impossible. If, on the
other hand, it roots in a unitary ground, and that an
intelligent one, order is provided for. The individuality
required for ethics and religion is secured by viewing it
as founded in the creative will of the Absolute. On the
other hand, if we deny creation, and assert the independent
existence of monads or souls, we have the problem of pre-
existence on our hands. Thit3 confronts us with the fact of
heredity, not yet cleared up on the basis of pre-existence;
and with the difficulty of accounting for the very exist-
ence of the many monads of spirits. The mind recoils from
beginning with more originals or ultimates than necessary.
If logic and the facts demand many originals, we would
accept them. It is certain that we must begin with something
unexplained. The one Intelligence '^ith which we start on a
monistic basis is simply accepted, not accounted for. But to
set out with a plurality of ultimates is unnecessarily
heaping up troubles for ourselves. Hence we assume that the
One only is basal, and that the many are dependent on it.
This fact of dependence we express in the idea of creation.
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McTaggart, who views "all existent reality as eternal and
ultimate," frankly accepts the idea of many originals. It
would be hard to argue with this state of mind. It is
scarcely to be supposed that this is his deliberate meaning.
More likely it is just this difficulty that pluralists have
not generally faced. Surely the mind finds it easier to
accept one mystery than many. If through such an acceptance
many problems are clarified, pragmatic if not logical con-
siderations justify the one assumption. It is not to be
claimed that we understand creation. It is claimed, however,
that to conceive of an uncreated One as being the Ground of
the many is easier and more reasonable than to conceive of
the uncreated many as being their own ground, or as ground-
less.
a surreptitious use of the notion of a unitary creative
Ground, a notion, of course, which is explicitly denied by
them. Howison speaks of a "system of causation," a
^grounding and constitutive principle of real existence."
whose effective operation is " a fronte " instead of " a tergo ."
He substitutes final for efficient causation altogether i and
this final cause is "grounding and constitutive." He is
quite explicit and insistent on this point. James Ward
("Realm of Ends, "459) well declares that to speak of final
cause as "constitutive" is "philosophical barbarism." -
fact, while denying creatinn explicitly, Howison really
affirms it. For example: "Real creation means such an
When we cone to Howison and Schiller we really have
(op.cit. pppcvii-xviii ) . This he defines as an "Ideal"
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eternal depe ndence of other souls upon God that the non-
existence of God would involve the non-existence of all
soulS, while his existence is the essential supplementing
Reality that raises them to reality; without him they
would be but void names and bare possibilities." (op.cit.
p xvii). Here God is affirmed to be the ground of the
existence of the many souls. Again, he says: "The self-
existent perfection of deity itself freely demands for its
fulfilment the possession of a world that is in God's own
image, and such a control of it as is alone consistent
with its being so." (op.cit. 75). Here the "constitutive"
power of God is something more than " vis a fronte ." The
very causal dependence that Howison denies in the interest
of his pluralism he is thus continually led to affirm in the
interest of system. Schiller denies creation, but accepts
teleology. It might be consistent to believe in purpose
and polytheism at the same time; but causality coul.i not be
denied. In a polytheistic scheme the teleology could be
held only because the gods were conceived as producing the
designed system. This productive or creative relation,
however, Schiller denies. How, then, can he properly
speak of teleology? A purpose must be the purpose of some
one who is achieving it. This dynamic relation is plural-
istically denied. Further, he is no more consistent than
Howison in holding to a denial of creation. He uses such
"to
terms as "guiding" and "overruling"^ describe the action of
his God. This "overruling" ,he would hasten to add, was exer-
cised by God over beings which he did not originally create.
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Very well; but a causal relation is implied in hi 3 state-
ments. Once admit such a^causal (efficient) relation and
the possibility of creation is established.
3. The Absolute as Intelligence .
Our conclusion thus far is that there can be only
one fundamental existence, and that this existence must be
thought of as Cause or creative Ground. The difficulties
of such a view from the standpoint of the diversities of
being remain unsolved, however, until we advance one step
further and think of this One under the form of intelligence.
The fundamental existence must be conceived of as a thinking
existence. Its unity and its causality are mere abstract-
ions unless they are conceived in the form of intelligence.
In man*s life of sl^ef- directive intelligence alone does he
find the type of causality. Here, too, is the only type of
real unity in experience. The psychological process of
thought is manifold, and mental impressions are many.
Through all this manifold, however, the thinking subject main-
tains its unity. Such unity as the thought process has it
receives through the meaning with which it is informed by
intelligence, the thinking subject, ^his subject posits
ideas, not as bare logical concepts, but as purposed plans.
In the constitutive act of thinking--the act which raises
psychological event into the realm of meaning, or real thought
man has direct experience of what is meant by creation or
causation. Just as the whole life of intellect depends on
this fundamental constitutive act of the thinking subject,
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so the whole order of cosmic "being depends on the central
creative Intelligence, of which it is the expression.
Farther, just as the diversity of sensation and thought
flow are bound together into a rational unity by the con-
stitutive activity of the mena^l subject, so the pluralism
of the world issues in a metaphysical monism through its
creative relation to the fundamental, grounding Intelligence.
The unity for which a true monism contends is not the formal
unity of classification, nor the abstract unity of a fused
aggregate; it is of the only sort of unity in diversity
that we actually experience in life, namely, the unity of
intelligent meaning amind the diversity of the stream of
consciousness. This view saves us from Eleatic rigidity,
or a "block universe." On any other basis than that of
intelligence our unity is abstract, not really exhibited in
life. Much monism has been of this abstract sort, and
pluralism is to be viewed as a reaction therefrom. The
reaction toward pluralism is psychologically intelligible.
The contention here sustained is simply that the reaction to
ultimate pluralism is after all not logically justified. An
abstract, absolute idealism is to be abandoned in favor of a
critical personalisti c idealism. Personal intelligence is
many without ceasing to be one. It produces plurality,
posits change, but itself transcends the flow, and in so
doing informs the chaotic and changing with the unity of
order and abiding meaning.
Such a causal Intelligence is rightly called
infinite and absolute. It is absolute in that it exists for
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itself in wholeness or independent completeness. All
depends for its existence on itj "but it depends on nothing
outside itself. It is infinite in that there are no limits
in the realm of actual existence to its activity as world
Ground. By the two terms "absolute" and "infinite" we
simply mean that the whole finite order is dependent on the
One. The fundamental category under which the Infinite and
Absolute is to he thought is personal intelligence. With
this in mind the confusions are avoided which arise when the
Infinite and Absolute are concieved spatially, mechanically,
or in any impersonal, abstract fashion.
4. The Absolute and Individuality .
From the pluralist quarter come three classes of
objections to the idea of an absolute and infinite God.
First, it is claimed that the very idea of personal intel-
ligence excludes absoluteness -
t
second, it is declared that
i^ there were a creative Absolute, human individuality and
freedom would be swallowed upi third, it is insisted that
the fact of evil hopelessly involves an infinite God. Howison
believes in a personal God and calls him infinite, but he
calls all the multitude of rational beings infinite also,
and denies that God is creator. This is a curious use of
the term "infinite." In reviewing the first edition of
"Limits of Evolution" McTaggart assumed because Howison hefcld
both pluralism and theism, that his theory was one of a
finite God. In the second edition Howison vigorously
protests against the term "finite." For his thinking divine
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infinity is not incompatible with a fundamental pluralism.
"Eternity, self-existence, self-activity, freedom and in-
finity are to me all interchangeable terms." (op.cit. 422).
Every spirit, therefore, not God only, is so designated.
Thus we see that Howison, while usin^ the term, does not
mean with it the ultimate dependence of all beings of! God.
He is interested in denying this dependence on account of
freedom in the human individual. Either the dependence or
the freedom must go, he thinks. And yet, men stand in a
very real relation to God, according to him. Not being their
efficient cause, he is their Pinal Cause, that is, the Ideal
T. pe toward which they are continually approximating, and
to which they shall finally attain in the perfected divine-
human society of the Kingdom of Heaven. McTaggart objects
to calling an "Ideal Type," this "sole mind possessing
absolute and eternal perfection," God. He insists that we
have no right to call a being by that name if we do not
understand by him the Creator so designated by traditional
usage. To this Howison rejoins that "this solitude of
self-existence, conjoined with this universal efficient
causality" is not the central and essential thing in the
traditional religious thought of Christendom. Creation may
be eliminated from our thought of the Deity. There still
remain holiness, justice, love. "To remove the name of
God from the clarified and purified conception of the eter-
nal Ideal Type would be to do violence, inexcusalbe affront,
to the deepest and truest element in the historical reli-
gious consciousness .. .What offends us in the Spinozistic
or other monistic appropriations of the name 'God 1 is the
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evident absence from their Absolute of all the essential
moral qualities. In these it is that true Deity lies, and
all God's metaphysical attributes must be ke^ed up to them;
not one of these •natural' attributes dare be construed in
any way that conflicts with the eternal moral essence."
(op.cit. 429-430). Howison thinks of the power of God as
solely the power of love. It is a vis a fronte , not a vis
a tergo . Of anything like coercion, the violation of indi-
viduality in lesser spirits, he will not think. Hence
final cause only, never efficient caise, i3 to be ascribed
to God. Thus we see that a God as restricted as is Howison'
s
may, with McTaggart, be referred to as "finite," in spite
of his protest against the term.
When we come to James and Schiller we find frank
use of the term "Finite God." In fact, James will not dogma-
tize about the possibility or impossibility of there being
more than one being who ought to be called God. "The
outlines of the superhuman consciousness thus made probable
must remain, however, very vague, and the number of
functionally distinct 'selves' it comports and carries has
to be left entirely problematic. It may be poly theistically
or it may be monotheisti cally conceived of." ( "Pluralistic
Universe," 310). God is one of us. He is no doubt the
greatest of us all, but to speak of him as in any sense
all-inclusive is nonsense. Such a god would be a strange
god. In fact, he is only an abstraction. We cannot believe
in him without denying that manifest world of many and often
disconnected things which a radical empiricism reveals. The
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world
too full of contradictions to be made all dependent on
one infinite God. Further, with such a God ali would be
fixed in a changeless order of predestination, and progress
and the zest of struggle and achievement would be ruled
out. "Only one thing is certain, and that is the result of
our criticism of the Absolute: the only way to escape from
the paradoxes and perplexities that a consistently thought-
out monistic universe suffers from as from a species of
auto-intoxi cat ion-- the mystery of the •fall* namely, of
reality lapsing into appearance, truth into error, perfection
into imperfection; of evil, in short, the mystery of universal
determinism, of the block-universe eternal without a history,
etc.;--the only way of escape, I say
,
from all this is to
be frankly pluralistic and assume that the superhuman
consciousness
,
however vast it may be, has itself an
external environment, and consequently is finite." (op.cit.
310). Such a "Finite God" would not leave us with the
problem of having to explain evil, because, not being
omnipotent, he could not be assumed to be able to prevent it.
Further, except on the foundation of an Absolute we are not
troubled with the idealistic pest of an antithesis between
appearance and reality. Moreover, such a "Finite God" has
decided religious superiority over his "rival" and "enemy,"
the Absolute. For the Absolute is timeless. Of what
comfort can such a God be to us in our struggles? For our
human experiences, those things which drive men naturally
to pray, are all lived in time. There can be no feeling at
home with a God who has no history, "The world that each of
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us feels most intimately at home with is that of beings
with histories that play into our history, whom we can
help in their vicissitudes even as they help us in ours.
This satisfaction the Absolute denies us i we can neither
help nor hinder it, for it stands outside of history."
(op.cit. 49). Only a God who lives in time can be touched
with a feeling of our infirmities.
The view of Schiller is substantially the same
as that of James. "The accumulation of the data enabling us
to estimate the drift of the v;orld-process enables us also
for the first time to develop consistently the finite and
personal elements in Theism; and following out this train
of thought we shall come to realize that religion, philosophy
and science alike demand a belief In a personal and limited
God." ( "Riddles of the Sphinx," 524). Again: "Thus an
infinite God can have neither personality nor consciousness,
for they both depend on limitation. Personality rests on
the distinction of one person from another, consciousness on
the distinction of Self and Not-Self." (op.cit. 313-314).
Such a God has religious value. The Absolute of philosophy
has not. As expressed in the above quotation, the only
God who could be conscious or personal must be finite. Further-
more, assertion of a "Finite God" is the only way to escape
from the maya philosophy. If the Deity is infinite, the
world as we experience it is simply illusion. "The asser-
tion, therefore, 0$ the finiteness of God is primari ly the
assertion of the knowableness of the world, of the commen-
surateness of the deity with our intelligence." (op. cit.
360). And again, If God is infinite, then, as the agnostics
teach, he is unknowable. For we cannot grasp the Infinite
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within the compass of our finite minds. An Unknowable ,i
t
is urged, may stir in us feelings of awe and reverence ; but
such a "being is not satisfying to our religious needs. Prom
this lack a "Finite God" does not suffer, (cf. op.cit. 360sq).
Our objection to this pluralistic notion of a
"Finite God" is based on metaphysical and ethical consider-
ations, (a) Metaphysical. A finite God will not serve to
hold the world together as a cosmos. As already argued in
the discussion of order, a cosmos, or a world that can become
anything for science, must be a unity. Professor James
says, indeed, "that the universe may actually be a sort of
joint-stock society of this sort, in Yhich the sharers
have both limited liabilities and limited powers, is of
course a sinp3.e and conceivable notion." (win to Believe,"
154). A "simple and conceivable notion" to the imagination,
perhaps, but not to thought. "God & Co., Ltd.," s -ggests
E. G.Ritchie. Even on the basis of pragmatism a unitary
world Ground ought to appear the most reasonable concep-
tion. For--call it a "postulate" if you will— the pre-
supposition of unity and coherence of all things is necessary
to make the sciences work. With such a postulate we are
enabled to work with phenomena, to predict the future, and
to harness the forces of nature to our human uses. If
that is the case, the principle or postulate of unity is
not to be sacrificed to the petulance due to the inability
to bring all things into order and regularity of law at
once. The coherence of elements in the cosmos is infinitely
improbable (I do not say formally impossible) on the
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supposition of a concurrence that took its start from each
single element separately. And if such a coherence is to
include the whole universe, a "Finite God" is not sufficient
to account for it. We talk at our own risk about any-
other kind of world. There is no guarantee whatever that it
could "be intelligible to us. Unless there is " one God,
one^ law, one element" from as well as "to which the whole
creation moves," we have no surety of a common understanding
of one another, nor of the fact that we are talking about
the same world to-day that we were considering yesterday
and that we hope still further to get acquainted with to-
morrow. Ultimate rationality, on the assumption of which
all our conversation, all our science and reasoning depends,
requires the dependence of the whole world on one rational
Being. (b) Ethical. The pluralists are much concerned
about freedom. Sfo doubt, a strong sense of freedom will
tend to a desirable ethical result, whether that will be
the practical result from the spread of pluralistic doctrines
may well be questioned. For on the basis of a "Finite God"
at least a certain amount of evil would have to be accepted
as ultimate and existing in its own right. If evil is the
product of misused freedom on the part of subordinate
beings, the responsibility of their freedom rejtsts heavily
on them, and they may be expected to do their part in the
eradication of their unfortunate works* But if we are
pluralists in order to lift the burden of evil from God,
at the same stroke we lift it from men. This we do not want
to do. Ethical considerations bid us not to slur over our
individual obligation. That is "hat happens, however, on
this pluralistic view of a "Finite God." A certain
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resignation results from considering evil as ultimate.
This resignation is precisely what ethics cannot tolerate,
and -hat the pluralist unsuccessfully seeks to avoid.
The verbal character of some pluralist objection
to divine infinity and absoluteness appears from the fact
that McT^ggart devotes a score of pages in "Some Dogmas of
Religion" to arguing against omnipotence because God
must be bound by the Law of Identity, the Law of the Ex-
cluded Middle, and by the fact that he could not make a
destructible indestructible object. For if he could make
such an object, then It would not be indestructible. Coild
there be anything more verbal? Of course, God cannot
transcend the Law of Identity, or set it aside. Neither
could he make two times two equal anything else than
four; nor cause a grindstone to turn both v/ays at the same
time; but that is only verbally denying omnipotence. The
statements are meaningless. God must be conceived of as
willing to be rational. If so, he cannot at the same time
will to do (or be able to, if one prefers to express it so)
the irrational things enumerated above.
Similarly
,
Schiller urges the fact of the world
being in process, not complete, as proof that God cannot be
infinite. If he were infinite he would be in every way com-
plete, his world likewise, there would be no need of
teleology, economy, adaptations, in order to bring this
world into final harmony with the divine will. "See "Riddles
of the Sphinx," 361). This is like the thought of Spinoza
when he rejected the teleological argument because it
would imply that God was imperfect, unsatisfied, and not
infinite. Spinoza adopts one horn of the dilemma-- either a

purposing and finite God, or a non-purposing and infinite
God- -while Schiller adopts the other. Both assume we are
shut up to such a dilemma* But are we? Is it not perfectly
conceivable that an infinite God should choose to realize his
will through a developing world? Is there anything more
attractive in a static system? The difficulty here arises
from a confusion of the being of God with his works or
creation. If God simply is the sum total of all that is,
then a developing world means an imperfect God. Bit if God
can he thought of, not as an infinite of space, hut of
intelligence, and therefore transcending his world, then
we are not driven to any such conclusion. The answer of
our pluralist here might be that a God distinct from his
world would not he infinite. But this would hold only on
the supposition that infinity involved spatial or quanti-
tative continuity. This is no necessary part of the concept
tion of infinity of dynamic intelligence. When we assert
God's infinity we do not mean that his substance extends
everywhere , but only that his control does.
Again, it is urged that an infinite God cannot
be personal or conscious, for "personality rests on the
distinction of one person from another, consciousness on
the distinction of Self from Not-Self. " (op. ci t. ,313-314)
.
But, does personality necessarily imply limitation? It
does in our case, but in to far as we are limited we fall
short of full personality. The essence of personality is
self-directive intelligence. We are limited in many ways,
both as to our power of self-direction and as to our in-
telligence. That simply means that our personality is
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incomplete, We have perfect personality only when the
limitations to self-direction and intelligence are absent--
that is, in the case of an Infinite God only. As to conscious-
ness implying the"distinc tion of self and Not-Self, M we may
dismiss that as a verbal objection to the personality of an
Infinite. Why should thei e not be a not-self for an Infinite?
Certainly if the Infinite is to be quantitatively conceived,
such a thing would be impossible. Not so, however, when
the Infinite is conceived dynami cally .In similar vein
Schiller urges that an infinite God would he unknowable,
(op.cit, 336). This is urged on the ground of the limita-
tions of our human faculties. We cannot grasp the Infinite
in our little minds. It is true that we cannot comprehend
the infinite^ but there is a difference between knowing
partially and knowing fully. So this objection may be
dismissed. The same argument could be brought against the
knowability of the world. It contains much that surpasses
our science, Moreover, no one human being will probably
ever possess all knowledge. Therefore, because the world
cannot be fully known it cannot be known at all. This is a
non sequitur of the same kind that Schiller argues when he
affirms that the unknowability of the Infinite in all his
fulness would prove the absolute unknowatility of such a
being at all.
We conclude, then, that an infinite and absolute
God may be personal and distinct from a world of selves
which he has created. This infinity must, however,
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not "be thought of as applying in the way either of space or
of substance, hut rather in the way of cause or dynamic.
In other words, between the pantheistic God of an absolute
idealism and the "Finite God" of pluralism there is the
theistic God who is the personal and creative ground of a
wo i Id of persons. We may take our answer to James' and
Schiller 1 s pluralist notion of a "Finite God w from the
mouth of the pluralist McTaggart. In "Some Dogmas of
Religion," (259-60), after discussing the device of saving
God's moral character by limiting his power, he sa„s: "Finally,
it is necessary once mere to emphasize the fact that, if
God's moral character is saved by limiting his power, we
have no ri^ht to be confident as to the eventual victory
of those ends in which God is inter ested. . .We do not even
know that they will not be almost completely defeated...
That is all that the doctrine of a no n- omnipotent God can
give us--a person who fights foi the good and who may be vic-
torious." Of course, McTaggart believes in no p,od at
all j but he rightly shows up the weakness of the notion of a
"Finite God." Our motive for believing in an infinite
One is precisely that set forth by McTaggart. The thought
of a God having created free spirits and being thwarted by
them for a time is tolerable; not so the thought of a God
who might be forever thwarted. Of a "Finite sod" this must
at least be a possibility.
The foregoing discussion shows that much of
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the confusion in the debate "between moniet and pluralist
comes from different ways in which the term "independence"
is employed. The pluralist agrees with his extreme oppo-
nent, the absolutist, in declaring that created beings can
have no real independence. In such a system God would be
all, and everything that happens would directly be his act.
To avoid this outcome the pluralist asserts absolute and
ultimate independence, as to ground ox c&uoe of being,,
of his monads. Now, the question is, must we follow him in
order to conserve true independence or individuality? To
this our answer is, No. If the world-ground is absolute
and infinite after the fashion above described, it is con-
ceivable that he should have the power to posit or create
beings in a measure like unto himself. If he not by neces-
sity, but of his own free choice endowed them with something
of his own freedom, then they would be in a real sense
independent, individuals, centres of selfhood as sufely
as He is himself. But Schiller and James are sure that in a
monistic system the many could never be independent or dis-
tinct from the One. ."For," says Schiller, (op. cit. p 552)
"the One, bein^ the sum total of existence , could generate
the many only out of itself, and however geneiated, their
generation could not serve any purpose, noi could the Many
really be independent of or distinct from the One. In
"hatever way we put it, the existence of the Many must be
illusory: they are of the substance of the One, and can
neither disown their parentage nor dissever themselves from
the One, which was and is and will be all things." It will
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be noticed in the phrase which I have italicized that
the mistake is made of conceiving of the Absolute as a quan-
titative infinite. Further, it is not necessary to assume,
as Schiller does, that in a monistic system the many could
never in any sense be independent or distinct from the one.
If the One Omnipotent willed it so, and "by his own free
choice limited himself in positing the many, then we might
have such independence in what would from thence be a plural-
istic system, but a s^'stem nevertheless that originally and
ultimately was monistic. The same author ("Humanism,"
p 69) declares that it is not intelligible to speak of an
evolving or still unfinished world as in any sense con-
tained in the embrace of an Absolute. This he holds for
two reasons: (l) Change is due either to outside stimulus,
or, (2) to a "psychical condition of di sequilibration , " that
is, to a condition of unsatisfied desire. Neither of these
could be applied to the Absolute without absurdity. The
Absolute cannot be affected from without, because there is
nothing outside it. On the other hand, to ascribe change in
the Absolute to the second cause would be a travesty.. An
Absolute v ith any want or unfulfilled desire in its natui e
would have no religious value. To this it may be conceded
at once that in the final sense there is nothing outside
the Absolute. Change in it could not be ascribed to outer
influences, and it is no part of our purpose to maintain
anything of the sort, indeed, rather, as against pluralism
we would maintain the impossibility of just that. From the
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second point we dissent. As already noted in a previous
section, our dissent is based on precisely the consideration
which Schiller urges in its favor, namely, the religious.
There is nothing inherently obj ecti enable in a God whose
"psychological condition is disequilibrated," to use the
author's expression, that is, in a God with unsatisfied
desire. This is sut>sly true from the standpoint of religion,
whatever may be true from that of an abstract pantheistic
Absolute. The gospel of the Christian religion proclaims a
God who suffers, loves, soirows, yearns, and therefore
acts, as Lotze rightly teaches, the relative independence
of finite spirits "consists, not in a 'Being outside the
Infinite' (for such a Being no definition could make clear),
but only in this, that they, as spiritual elements, have
Being for self . This 'being for self is the essential
factor in that which we, in a formally unsatisfactory way,
designate as 'Being outside the Infinite'". ("Outlines of
Metaphysic," 155). Conscious selfhood is what constitutes
our independence, not self origination, we know ourselves
and are aware of the fact that we can act, initiate, to a
certain degree. Just so far we are true individuals. This
is compatible with the idea that the power of self activity
and self consciousness is derived from an Absolute, and not
original with ourselves. If, as a matter of terminology,
it still be urged that we had better not call the God of such
a conception the "Absolute," a concession mi^ht be made. It
may seem more exact to use that term to denote the sum of all
being: God, the Infinite; finite spirits; the world or the
phenomenal order. This is the usage of Hastings Rashdall.
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There is, however, a quantitative connotation in this use of
the word which agrees ill with a critical metaphysics.
This matter need not be debated. The point to insist on is,
that by use of the term "absolute" or "infinite" we wish to
denote the view that God is the ultimate ground of all
that is; that nothing exists in original or eternal inde-
pendence of the one Cause.
The difficulties in the matter of providing for
real individuals in a monistic scheme, so urgently pressed
by pluralism, rest on a mistaken conception of the rela-
tion between the One and the many. If this relation is to
be thought of as one of metaphysical substance, the
criticisms of pluralism are well founded. A monism of
ontological stuff is untenable. The difficulties disappear,
however, when the relation between the One and the many is
personally conceived. Active intelligence positing its
objects, that is a form according to which we may think
the world Ground as immanent in all being and yet as
creating beings like itself, centers of self-directive,
conscious life, and therefore indi vi dually real. A
thoroughly self-centered Absolute, to which the pluralist
objects, is practically inconceivable. As the human indi-
vidualjrealizeB his nature only in self-expression to the
extent of self-sacrifice, so the divine Individual. This
Individual, as truly as his creatures, is ethical or non-
existent. To this statement the pluralist would heartily
assent. As ethical^ he too, must find his life through
self-impartation. Otherwise God would be a lower order
of being than his creatures. If, then, he really does
impart of his very nature to his creatures, -fcney may be

conceived of as children; and thus human individuality
is fully provided for.
Justice requires a full recognition of the ethical
motive of pluralists at this point. Criticism can dispose
of their metaphysical conclusions vhile at the same time
noting that pluralistic ideals are embraced "because their
exponents wish to champion the cause of freedom. Their
theory is professedly based on an appreciation of person-
ality. It is natural to expect, then, that they sho ild be
indeterminis ts# James and Schiller are pragmatists, and
their belief in freedom is related to their voluntarism. The
whole cognitive life depends, for them, on a certain fiee
exercise of our faculties in striving to satisfy human
needs. James goes farther than any of the others in his
affirmation of indeterminism. He boldly makes use of the
word "chance." He is very much in earnest with "contingency."
There are open possibilities in the universe, and he is
entirely averse to any attempt to heal them over in any
finally absolute system. This position he takes with the
greater assurance that he is a convinced "radical empiri-
cist." Power to the contrary i_s a fact of experience.
Contingency we meet, and only solijpisti cation can explain it
away. Why seek to go "tack of the patent fact? Accept it as
ultimate. In some such way runs his thought. He refuses to
be made uncomfortable by the possibility of having to
posit things which cannot be fitted into a finally rational
system. "Make as great an uproar about chance as
you please, I know that chance means pluralism and
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nothinb more. If some of the members of the pluralism are
had, the philosophy of pluralistic realism, whatever broad
views it may deny me, permits me, at least, to turn to the
other members with a clean breast of affection and an unso ph-
is ti cat e^moral sense. " ("Will to Believe, H p 178). So, also,
we see, that on the subject of freedom Howison is most
explicit. He records his disagreement with Jan es' "confessed
and despairing ultimate irrati onalism. " This is in reference
to a remark of James: "Accordi n^ to that philosophy (plural-
istic or individualistic philosophy), the truth is too great
for any one actual mind, even though that mind be dubbed
'the Absolute,' to know the whole of it.... There is no point
of view absolutely public an<1 universal." The significance
of th£s- di fference between Howison and James is this. Jam s
is a pluralist because he is an empiricist. Howison is not
an empiricist, but a rati onalist in epistemology. He is a
pluralist cVxiefly from ethi cajconsi deratL ons. He th inks that
man cannot be considered free and tha.t the lav, cf determinism
cannot be overcome unless we give up the notion of man as a
created be i ng. Hence he embraces pluralism, for freedom must
be maintained at all costs. "There is no escaping from the
reasoning of an Augustine, a Calvin, an Ed- ards, except by
removing its premise. That premise is the utter finitude of
the' creature'
,
resting upon the co nception that the Divine
functions of creation and regeneration, more especially
creation, are operations by what is called 'efficient' causa-
tion, that is, causation by direct productive energy, whose
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effects are of course as helpless before it as any motion
is before the impact that starts it." (op.cit. 331),
On the next page: "No being that arises out of efficient
causation can possibly be free." This shows to what
logical lengths Howison is willing to go to save freedom.
He sacrifices efficient causation altogether, substituting
final causation in its place, in the relation between God
and man. From all this it is apparent that the freedom the
pluralists arrive at is that of cosmic free-booters , not
that of sons of God. In fact, pluralism does not secure
real freedom for us at all. For the individual has his
real life of freedom, not in isolation, but in relation to
others, in society. The term freedom has no meaning for
one living in a world alone. Wow, the individual of plur-
alism really lives alone. There may be myriads of others
like himself, but he never can get into relation with them
on a pluralistic basis. As soon as pluralism becomes
"harmonic" it ceases to be pluralism. The contention of
pluralistic metaphysics is, that if the many depend for
their being on the One, this One would be the only free
agent. Whatever the many did, the One would be solely
responsible for it. If God could have refrained from making
us, or could have destroyed us, as Schiller suggests, and
did not in the face of our evil-doing, he must be charged
with the blame of our sin. This conception rests on a
strange view of the divine creative activity. It would
hold only if in creating man God had made automata. In
that case he would be chargeable with the acts of such
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mechanisms. It is different if we look upon finite spirits
as creatures deliberately endowed with freedom.
Hence we conclude that the fact tit human freedom
does not demand pluralism in order to clear the skirts of
God from responsibility for evil and sin. Rather, the very
term H free" as applied to finite spirits implies that the
relation between the One and the many is such as to preclude
any compromise of the divine character. "While we admit
that the recoil of pluralism from a pantheistic absolute
idealism is justified, we repeat that the pluralism of
metaphysically independent elements is not the only way out
of the difficulty. Professor Schiller caricatures monism
on the subject of dissociation of personality by reference to
the case of the"Beauchainp family. 1' He represents the
problem of different persona all being grounded in the One
Absolute by comparison with the phenomena of the subliminal
in psychology. Here was the case of a certain Miss Beau-
champ who in different psychological states appeared resp-
ectively as "Saint, " "rally, " "Idiot," and then again just
Miss Beauchamp. On the monist theory, Schiller goes on to
say, "All existences would be secondary personalities of
the one Absolute differing infinitely in their contents,
character, and capacity, and capable of coexistence and
concurrent manifestation to a much greater extent than
were the members of the Beauchamp family, in which this
power was possessed only by 'Sally.' We should accordingly
all be the "Idiots," "Saints," and "Sallies" of the univer-
sal Beauchamp family which had been engendered by the
'Dissociation' of the Absolute, This might not be alto-
gether pleasing to all of us (especially to those who,
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like the writer, would seem to have been predestined to be
among the "Sallies" of the Absolute); but the idea itself
would be qdte conceivable and free from theoretical ob-
jection." (Journal of Philosophy , " etc., Vol. Ill, No. 18,
a 480). The satire of Professor Schiller holds as against
pantheism. But a fundamental monism is not necessarily
pantheistic. It is possible to conceive of one sole
Ground of all being and of true individualty of persons at
the same time. The fact that persons are truly distinct
is no necessary indication that they have always been so,
and that they carry the ground of their independence in
themselves. It is thinkable that the independence of
persons, or such relative independence as they may possess,
ha8 been decreed and achieved by the one causal Ground
which lies back of the whole world process, or which is
fimmanent in it. This would furnish the reason for con-
ceiving of a monistic world in which personality and free-
dom could dwell. Perhaps the term "pluralism" might be
applied to this view, because metaphysical freedom would be
affirmed of the finite spirits that make up the world. Stri
ly, however, it would not be exact to call this pluralism.
For it would be a world where all ultimately depended on
the One. The One woild be thought of as having founded the
independence. The whole system depending on the One,
it would not be beyond the range of possibility to suppose
that the independence, once conferred, could be taken
away, or the very existence of the independent beings
cancelled. Thus by the creative will of the One, which we
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may alBO suppose to be a will of benevolent wisdom, the
dignity of freedom would have been conferred, This would
give a basis for ethics t but it would be a freedom limited
to the extent of the universal and final dependence of the
many on the One.
The absolute independence of the pluralist could
not exist in a social world and a world of common speech
and understanding. If the absolute metaphysical independ-
ence and eternal separateness of spirits be a fact, there
is no way to provide for their getting together in a system
of mutual intelligibility. Each would constitute a system
for itself. The. fact that they can speak to one another
and understand one another proves that they are not inde-
pendent in any pluralistic sense. The fundamental cate-
gories of thought are the same for all of them, as the
words of a language are the same for all who speak it. This
indicates an ideal bond of union between all the separate
elements of the world of spirits. The fact of this bond or
connection is just as significant as the freedom or inde-
pendence of the spirits who are thus united. How are we
going to account for this bond? Not on any pluralistic
ground. This would require the assumption of a chance
commensurabili ty and concurrence of many altogether separate
elements. This is too enormous an assumption to make. The
logical strain is less upon us when we infer that the
mutuality of separate spirits implies that there is a One
which is the final ground of all the many.
With all their concern foir freedom and individ-
uality, the pluralists may be charged with rendering imposs-
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ible a successful foundation for ethiCB. Ethics, and the
motive to a moral life, depend on "belief in a rational
moral order. If th^ world is such, it is the system and
the expression of One. William James seems to be of another
opinion. Feeling the importance of real freedom for true
morality, he concludes that finite spirits must exist in
metaphysical independence of God, whom, in turn, he like-
wise conceives of as finite. In "Will to Believe," (174-5)
we read: "Our responsibility ends with the performance of
duty, and the burden of the rest we may lay on higher
powers. Very well. The question arises, can we feel the
confidence of laying "the burden of the rest on higher
powers" unless we believe that all things f ofrUt a rational
systa? In other passages James does not thus comfortingly
refer us to the "higher powers" for the assurance that
things will come out all right. He makes, rather, stirring
appeals to us as independent spirits to help the "Finite
God" in hid struggle to prevent a cosmic crash. The fact
is, our ethical assurance rests on a' belief that oar moral
maxims are founded on the very nature of things. This
(metaphysical) nature we conceive to be rational, and
therefore right. If it is rational it is not disjunct,
but uniform; and if uniform it all proceeds from a One.
This is the dialectic of any ethic which seeks to operate
on a higher basis than expediency, any ethic that makes
earnest with the word "duty," as James does in the above
quotation. Ethics lays its demands upon us, calls us to
submit caprice and passing whim, because of an assumed
right to exact submission of the many to the One. Implicit
here is the conviction that the feeling of the individual
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is not fundamental , that there is something more basic.
This fundamental ought to rule. This is ethics. It is
precisely, however, what pluralism denies. The feeling of
the individual is considered to be the true and ultimate re-
ality. This is the immediately given and hence final fact
of a "radical empiricism. " wTiy speak of an "ou^ht" that
lies back of or stands over the individual fact and feeling?
Any true ethic does just this, however. Hence ethics, any
system of obligatory morality, carries with it the refu-
tation of pluralism.
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5. The Absolute and Evil .
The ascription of metaphysical independence to
the human individual is of a piece with the pluralist
solution of the problem of evil. Howison is able to dis-
pose of this problem because in a pluralistic system God
is not bound up with all parts of being, both good and bad.
It may, however, be doubted whether Howison succeeds in
extricating the God of his "Harmonic Pluralism" from the
world* s evil. Nevertheless, that is intended to be the
implication of his pluralism. "Between mind and mind,
between God and all other minds, there is no causation but
Pinal Cause; the sole realm of Efficient Cause is the realm
of Nature, whether physical or psychic, objective or sub-
jective; efficient causation operates from the non-divine
minds to their natural (orjphenoraenal) and sensuous contents,
or else, in a secondary manner, between the serial terms
of these. Hence God is in no wise responsible for the evil
,
either natural or moral, that we find in the world of exper-
ience , but only for the good that gradually arises in it;
and even for this good only in chief." (op.cit. 392, italics
mine ) .According to James, the great hindrance to light on
the problem of evil is the absolutist habit of thought.
Monistically to refer all being to one ultimate cause
amounts to one of two things: either we besmirch the char-
acter of our God; or we dreamily reduce the distinction
between good and evil to illusion. From both of these
difficulties a pluralistic metaphysics saves us. A good
bath of empiricism is an effective antidote to the abso-
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lutist reduction of evil to maya . He refers approvingly
to Carlyle»s gospel of work. We escape the perplexities of
of the problem of evil in a practical way of worthy acti-
vity. "But what is the essence of this philosophy of
objective conduct, so old-fashioned and finite, but so
compared
chaste and sane and strong, when o»par-ed with its r omantic
rival? "With "romantic rival" James means the absolutist
merging of good and evil alike in God). It is the recog-
nition of limits, foreign and opaque to our understanding.
It is the willingness, after bringing about some external
good, to feel at peace; for our responsibility ends with
the performance of that duty, and the burden of the rest we
may lay on higher powers.
'Look to thyself, Universe,
Thou art better and not worse,*
we may say in that philosophy, the moment we have done our
stroke of conduct, however small. For in the view of that
philosophy the universe belongs to a plurality of seni -
lndependent forces , each one of which may help or hinder, and
be helped or hindered by, the operations of the rest."
"Will to Believe," 174-175, italics mine), oschiller de-
clares we manufacture the problem of evil for ourselves.
It is a matter of perveted will ,--no tjthe evil, but the
problem. We "revel in infinities." ^his is bad taste.
If we only come to our senses and give up the foolish notion
of an infinite God the problem vanishes. "The insolubility
of the 'mystery of evil* arises simply and solely out of the
fact that people will neither abandon the practice of
passing moral judgments on events, nor the dogmas which
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render all ethical valuation an ultimate foolishness. As
soon as they make up their distracted minds' (wills ) which
of the incompatible alternatives they will choose to abide
by, whether they prefer to vindicate the supreme validity
of moral distinctions, or the 'infinity of God' an. the
absolute 'unity of the universe,' the mystery disappears."
("Axioms as Postulates," in "Personal Idealism," 130). In
another connection Schiller puts what he evidently considers
a "poser" at the monistic philosopher when he asks him,
"Why were so many millions of fleas essential to the
happiness or comfort of the Absolute?" One perfect speci-
men ought to have been enough. On a pluralistic basis,
however, such a difficulty would never arise. It no
longer becomes necessary to insist on a Goa who is at once
almighty and benevolent. Such evil as does exist may be
ascribed to an imperfect harmony among ultimate spirits,
or egos. Moreover, a pluralistic world view which includes
belief in metempsychosis promises well for working evil
out of the cosmic system, fcf "Riddles of the Sphinx,"
chap. X, on "Man and God."). Souls who have the taint
pf evil cannot be destroyed, of course, for they form part
of ultimate reality and hence are indestructible ; but their
consciousness can be reduced to a low order, and in a state
of torpor they could be induced to fall in line with the
laws of the cosmos and so be made worthy of a higher form
of existence in another birth. This is to be conceived of
as going from stage to stage of perfection; not, however,
without the possibility of a fall downward remaining
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until at last "a complete harmony of all existences has
"been attained."
The chief points to note in these pluralistic
attempts to solve the problem of evil an e two: (l) a deter-
mination to save the character of God in the face of the
world's maladjustments ; , (2) a conviction that the mystic?
poetic haze which blurs moral distinctions must be avoided.
Hence the pluralist feels driven to assert a "Finite Goa."
The fact of evil and error makes of any Absolute a monster,
he declares. This would be the case if there were no
longer any room for individuality in the system of an Abso-
lute. It may be conceded that the pluralist is right as
regards a system of abstract absolutism. But the Absolute
need not be conceived pantheisti cally • A theistic Absolute
does not swallow up everything. All depends on him for its
being; but he has so ordered that a certain class of beings
which depend on him (spirits) shall be like himself.
Thenceforward they have self existence, which they may use
or abuse "ithin limits, of course, but limits of wide
range. It is the other kind of Absolute that the pluralists
have in view when they criticize it for its implication
with error and evil. For example, Schiller, ("Riddles of the
Sphinx," 316): "Nor again, can the responsibility for
evil be shifted to the Devil or to the perversity due to
human free will, unless these powers really limit the
divine omnipotence. For if we or the Devil are permi tted to
do evil while God is able to prevent or destroy us, the
real responsibility rests with God." Here he truly says we
cannot shift the responsibility for evil to human freedom
without limiting the divine omnipotence. It is true, there

94
is a limitation on God, but it is not necessary to think of
this limitation after the fashion of the pluxalists and make
it eternal and necessary. Rather, we can th^.nk of it as
self-imposed. There is a difference "between external
limitation and self-chosen limitation. The former would
make God finite. ?he latter he may assume in the noimal
functioning of his absoluteness.
Now, if we thus have a self-limiting on the part
of the Absolute, we have the way paved for the beginnings of
a solution of the problems of error and evil. If. in reality
we are free, then we may misuse our freedom. ir faculties
as grounded by or depending on the Absolute are right j but
they will uow be subject to careless or wilful use. Tne
result will be error. In the same way moral evil will
arise when we abuse our moral freedom. Moreover, on this
view v,e have the promise of a final solution in favor of
truth and good. If in the last analysis all depends on
God, we may be confident that it will come out all right.
This pluralism cannot promise, because with a "Sinite
God 11 contingency must remain eternal. The issue may be good,
but the possibility must always remain for it to be otherwise.
No guarantee is afforded that right will finally prevail.
A finite God might be a defeated God. If we are sure from
the start that God cannot fail, as Howison and Schiller
are, then our God is not finite. It ought to be remarked that
Howison does not so designate his God; but he has so many
"infinites" in his system that it amounts to the same thing.
His use of the term "infinite" is a solecism. Schiller
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and James employ the term. This "Finite God" may he ever
so strong and ever so good. Still he remains finite. It is
no mere fancy which sees in modern pluralism a connection
with Gnosticism of old. They are not parts of a connected
movement, but in a real sense they are expressions of the
same mood of mind. H. G. Wells, literary pluralist, recog-
nizes and parries the parallel in his "God the InvisibleKing.
Gnosticism was propounded partly from a feeling that evil
must "be removed far from God. But it left men with a
world in which evil was inherent in its very being, and
from vhich the holy God was removed to an infinite distance.
The outcome was not hopeful for its final solution, and the
practical effect was to drive men to an unnatural asceti-
cism. Thus, also, the pluralists call God "finite" to
relieve him of responsibility for the world* s evil. The
problem of evil is great enough, surely; but the Gnostics
and pluralists magnify it. That is, they insist on its
essential insolubility for the world
.
It is very evil. To
think of God related + o it is to degrade him. Hence a kind
of Manichaeism is advanced. The evil here is due to
devils, a hierarchy of them. To be true, the outcome of
the battle against it remains in doubt on such a hypothesis;
but at any rate the moral character of such God as is left
is hypothetically saved.
In all this we see how the problem of evil in a
system depending on an Absolute is magnified by pluralism on
account of the failure to distinguish between an Absolute
as substanc e and an Absolute as cause. Schiller objects
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that in a system such as Lotze's monism H all the phases of
existence are alike charactei i stic of the All." ("Humanism",
81). This criticism overlooks the fact that an Absolute might
posit free "beings within its system. "Once equate God
with the totality of existence ,"-- (page 8l)--but a true
monism does not "equate" God with the totality of thingsi it
refers them to him as their causal Ground. This Ground
may have chosen to create free beings. This assertion
holds on the supposition that the world Ground be viewed
as free Intelligence. If it be viewed simply under the
category of substance, the statement would not hold, of
course j but such a viev/ is untenable. The immanent One is
not stuff, but Intelligence in action. Such a creative
Intelligence may see fit to elevate some of its creatures
to a position of likeness with itself. In that case there
would be a limitation of the One, but a free limitation,
one that might conceivably be recalled, and hence by no
means one that could be taken as the basis for a pluralistic
view of the world. The ultimate dependence of the many
would be on the One.
We are compelled to recognize that pluralism
leads to no optimistic solution of the problem of evil.
The separate beings fight alone. On the other hand, under
a monistic view evil cannot be accepted as a final aspect
of reality. The very fact, if it be a fact, that God is the
ultimate reality, gives assurance that evil will be over-
come. The fact that God, in a monistic system, must be
viewed as sharing in the experiences of all beings, evil
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included, is an earnest of that evil being ultimately over-
come, some monists claim that the evil was predetermined
for a benign end. It is possible to see how good ends
are actually served through, evil without assuming that God
originally willed it. Freedom in finite spirits so strongly
emphasized by the pluralist, would account for the origin
of moral evil. At the same time, the assurance, open only
on the plane of a basal monism, that in the plan of an
infinite God this evil was vanquished, would produce a
type of devotion and abandon in the moral struggle such as
a belief in an eternal contingency and uncertainty could
hardly exhibit. Professor James magnifies the moral appeal
of pluralism, a system which gives the individual to feel
that something really depends on himself, and that God
himself might be caught in ruin unless each man does his
part to avert the cafLmity. It may be affirmed, however,
that the steadiest will and most unflinching characters
have been developed under the influence of a conviction
that the Universe was on the side of righteousness in the
moral conflict. Such a conviction is the antithesis of
pluralism.
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